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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of recent corporate scandals at world-renowned companies such 
as Enron and WorldCom, public confidence in the role of the auditing 
profession plummeted. At the time, the profession was no longer perceived to 
be acting in the best interests of the public thus prompting regulatory 
authorities and civic organisations to initiate certain intervention measures. In 
America, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted which 
introduced mandatory sweeping corporate governance initiatives. When SOX 
was introduced, it was criticised for triggering increased compliance costs as 
well as creating fee opportunities for the audit profession (Griffin & Lont, 
2007).  
In South Africa, corporate reforms came in the form of King-I to III codes of 
corporate governance. In particular, King-III introduced the concept of 
integrated reporting (IR) which recommends that companies report holistically 
on both financial and sustainability (economic, social and environmental) 
issues. In contrast to SOX, the application of King-III is voluntary on an “apply 
or explain” basis. 
Using a quantitative approach with multiple regression analysis and Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA as the statistical techniques, three sets of models were 
run to examine two hypotheses. The first hypothesis sought the evidence 
pointing to whether the BIG4 audit firms were charging an audit fee premium 
in response to the recommendation of King-III on IR, while the second 
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hypothesis examined if there was a relationship between audit fees and non-
audit service fees. The empirical results of the study attested to the BIG4 
firms charging an audit fee premium while also proving a statistically 
significant relationship between the two types of fees. 
The findings of the research study have implications for both the auditing 
profession and for the regulators, and will also add a South African dimension 
to the existing body of knowledge on the subject. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Recent corporate scandals have compelled the world to acknowledge the 
central role played by corporate governance in the global economy (Vaughn & 
Ryan, 2006). As a result of the scandals, which were blamed on the poor 
quality of corporate governance, society lost much of its confidence in the 
auditing profession and there was a growing perception that the profession 
was no longer acting in the interests of the public (Odendaal & De Jager, 
2008). The debacles at iconic companies such as WorldCom and Enron 
feature in several studies (Anandarajan, Kleinman, & Palmon, 2012, 
Caneghem, 2009, Hay, Knechel, & Li 2006) in which the focus is on the failure 
of governance and in particular, the role of auditing.  
In South Africa, corporate collapses included Masterbond, Regal Treasury 
Private Bank, LeisureNet, Saambou and MacMed (Odendaal & De Jager, 
2008). These collapses resulted in bodies such as the Integrated Reporting 
Committee of South Africa (IRC) believing that events such as the global 
financial crisis, the ever-present socio-economic inequality, resource 
constraints and the effects of climate change, clearly demand that both public 
and private organisations, openly communicate the impact of global trends on 
their activities as part of their reporting obligations to their stakeholders (IRC, 
2011). The IRC (2011) contends that the type of information that is currently 
being reported by companies tends to be backward-looking with a bias 
towards financial information and, thus, it is of little use in terms of decisions 
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which enable stakeholders to evaluate an organisation’s ability to generate 
value and sustain itself in the short-, medium-, and long-term. 
Consequently, there is a growing trend, both nationally and internationally, for 
organisations to issue integrated reports (IRC, 2011). In South Africa, the King 
Code of Governance for South Africa 2009, popularly referred to as King-III, 
came into effect on 1st March 2010 in response to the provisions of the new 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 and also to changes in international governance 
trends (Institute of Directors (IOD), 2009). Among the key changes, King-III 
makes a recommendation for companies to issue an integrated report (IR), 
which combines both financial and sustainability reporting in one report (IOD, 
2009).  
Commenting on the proposal to introduce IR in Australia, Adams and Simnett 
(2011) stated that the setting up of the systems for measurement and 
reporting on an integrated basis could represent a large cost for certain 
organisations. Similarly, Griffin and Lont (2007) maintain that the introduction 
of mandatory and sweeping new corporate governance initiatives in the 
United States of America, in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002, resulted in incremental compliance costs for companies estimated to be 
in the region of $1.24 billion. In addition, SOX created unique challenges and 
fee opportunities for the auditing profession, which led to high fees being 
charged by audit firms, especially for the provision of non-audit services  
(Griffin & Lont, 2007).  
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In light of the experiences in other countries, it would be interesting to 
understand the nature of the challenges that IR poses to companies in South 
Africa with a special focus, as in this research study, on external auditing 
costs.   
1.2 Statement of the problem 
King-III ushered in the new concept of IR by recommending that all 
companies issue an integrated report, which combines both sustainability and 
financial information in a single report (IOD, 2009). Nevertheless, compliance 
with King-III is not compulsory as its application is based on the “apply or 
explain” principle. In the same vein, the position of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) with regards to the compliance of listed companies in respect 
of IR is summarised in a guidance letter dated 31 January 2013. The letter 
reads as follows: 
“…The JSE’s general approach to corporate governance in relation to the 
King Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa…is that certain 
principles are mandatory with the balance being adopted on an “apply or 
explain” basis. Chapter 9 of the King Code which deals with Integrated 
Reporting and disclosure is not a mandatory principle pursuant to our recent 
guidance and can therefore be applied on an “apply or explain basis…”  
(JSE, 2013). 
Despite the position taken by the JSE, Furber (2013) seems to interpret King-
III’s recommendation as follows: “…integrated reporting…led South Africa to 
become the first country to make this form of reporting mandatory for plcs.”  
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Despite the fact that King-II was the first to recommend the notion of 
sustainability reporting, this was done separately from financial reporting 
(IOD, 2009). This is in contrast to the view of the IRC (2011) which 
differentiates IR as not merely a consolidation of the financial statements and 
a sustainability report but as a  
“…concise overview of an organisation, integrating and connecting important 
information about strategy, risks and opportunities and relating them to 
societal, environmental, economic and financial issues.”    
According to Adams and Simnett (2011), IR is holistic, strategic, responsive 
and relevant across multiple future timeframes. In this regard, King-III 
recommends that certain sections of the IR be verified by independent 
assurers and this is notwithstanding the traditional assurance process which 
auditors provide in the form of a statutory audit.  
King-III distinguishes the process of assurance from verification by stating that 
verification confirms the existence of stated facts while assurance is much 
broader and refers to the integrity of certain processes and systems. In 
addition, the assurance regarding sustainability performance and reporting is 
more complex as it does not adhere to clear standards as is the case with 
financial reporting (IOD, 2009). Accordingly, King-III recommends the use of 
both AccountAbility’s AA 1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) and the 
International Accounting and Auditing Standard Board’s International 
Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE 3000) in combination on such 
assurance engagements. External assurance providers may include external 
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auditors, regulators (inspectorate) or any other assurance providers such as 
sustainability assurance providers, actuaries and geologists (IOD, 2009).  
In this regard, King-III principle 3.4 (44) recommends that the audit committee 
“…should engage the external auditors to provide an assurance report on 
summarised financial information, confirming that the summarised financial 
information is appropriately derived from the annual financial statements.” In 
view of the fact that the summary information is derived from both the more 
detailed annual financial statements and the sustainability report as already 
audited or assured, auditors are required to report in accordance with 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) (IRC, 2011). Other assurance 
services are also recommended on sustainability reporting and disclosure 
(IOD, 2009). As observed by the IRC (2011), “developing the ideal integrated 
report will be a journey for many organisations and so too will the extent and 
level of assurance.”    
Current reporting has been criticized for being backward-looking and therefore 
failing to provide stakeholders with forward-looking information that enables 
an objective evaluation of an organisation’s ability to create both value and 
long-term sustainability (IRC, 2011).  
Consequently, according to the IRC (2011), King-III suggests the inclusion of 
the following eight elements in the Integrated Report: (1) a report profile which 
outlines the scope and boundary of the report, the reporting principles relating 
to IFRS and sustainability in terms of GRI, policy on assurance services and 
any major supporting documentation; (2) organisational overview, business 
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model, and governance structure including information such as the size of the 
organisation, the location of its operations and activities, its products and 
services, its structure including divisions, subsidiaries, associates and joint 
venture, the business model, claims on resources, governance structures 
and, key policies, etc.; (3) the operating context which includes an outline of 
the organisation’s ability to create value in the short-, medium-, and long-term; 
an outline of the relevant financial, social, environmental, economic and 
governance issues and trends; global trends such as exchange rates, 
commodity prices; both negative and positive significant impact decisions; 
principal risks and opportunities; (4) strategic objectives, competencies and 
key performance areas (KPIs) such as short, medium and long-term 
objectives and targets; an evaluation of the organisation’s competencies 
(internal systems, personnel and culture) and; a list of priority KPIs; (5) an 
account of the organisation’s performance in the form of abridged financial 
statements; factors affecting profits; identification of unusual/non-operating 
items; segment information; capital expenditure, research and development 
commitments; financial and economic value added statements and; 
organisation’s activities in respect of its strategic objectives and targets; (6) 
future performance objectives outlining a clear statement of intent regarding 
future performance and a forward-looking reflection on internal systems, 
personnel and culture;  (7) remuneration policies, including information on 
policies for remuneration of senior executives and employees in general; 
report on current period remuneration and factors influencing future policies, 
and; (8) an analytical commentary in the form of a brief commentary on the 
organisation’s structure, its members, current and future performance; 
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strategic objectives; financial ratios; economic, environmental, and social and 
governance information; summarised historic information; etc. (IRC, 2011). 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the research study was to evaluate whether the BIG4 audit 
firms were charging an audit fee premium as a result of the recommendations 
of King-III on integrated reporting for companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange.  
1.4 Significance of the study 
Prior studies (Anandarajan et al, 2012; Ashbaugh,2004; Holland & Lane, 
2012; Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2012) proved that the level of audit fees 
may have adverse effects on how auditors conduct themselves such as 
compromising their independence, and this could lead them not to disclose 
cases of clients managing earnings and as a result, this could affect the 
quality of the audit process. As observed by Charles, Glover, and Sharp 
(2010), any study of the drivers of auditors’ pricing practices is important to 
researchers, audit firms, investors, regulators and audit clients. Hoitash, 
Markelevich, and Barragato (2007) corroborate that any study of the fees paid 
to auditors adds an important dimension to the on-going conversation on the 
way in which the accounting profession should be organised and monitored. 
Of equal importance is the fact that the majority of prior studies (Ebrahim, 
2010; Huang et al, 2009; Umar & Anandarajan, 2004) on audit fees have 
been on single country settings with the majority of such studies being 
17 
 
conducted in countries in Europe and America. It would appear that, since the 
introduction of King-III, there has been no study in South Africa that has 
focused on the impact of King-III on the pricing of both audit and non-audit 
services fees. Thus this research study is of significance in that (1) it seeks to 
fill in this apparent void on the study of the impact of IR on audit fees since 
King-III was introduced as well as (2) to augment existing literature on the 
subject by adding a South African dimension.   
1.5 Research questions 
The research study sought to answer the following two complementary 
questions:  
1.5.1 Research question 1: 
Post King-III, were the BIG4 audit firms in South Africa charging an audit fee 
premium in response to the recommendations of the code on integrated 
reporting?  
The following research hypotheses were based on this preceding question: 
H0: Post King-III, there was no evidence that the BIG4 audit firms were 
charging an audit fee premium in response to the recommendations of the 
code on integrated reporting. 
H1: Post King-III, there was evidence that the BIG4 audit firms were 
charging an audit fee premium in response to the recommendations of the 
code on integrated reporting. 
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1.5.2 Research question 2: 
Was there a relation between audit fees and non-audit service fees? 
Prior studies have proved that the simultaneous provision of both the statutory 
audit and non-audit services result in knowledge spill-overs (Simunic, 1984), 
and consequently this may lead to the arbitrary allocation of fees in the books 
of the auditee probably in pursuance of incentives for partners (Hay et al, 
2006).  
The following hypotheses were based on this research question: 
H0: Post King-III, there was no significant relation between audit and non-
audit service fees. 
H1: Post King-III, there was a significant relation between audit and non-
audit service fees. 
1.6 Definition of terms 
Audit fees refer to the fees that are charged by external auditors for carrying 
out the statutory annual audit of the financial statements of an organisation. 
Non-audit service fees refer to any fees other than audit fees and include 
fees for services such as tax compliance, tax advice, tax planning, mergers 
and acquisitions and corporate governance.   
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1.7 Structure of the report 
The report is organised in the following order. In chapter 2, a literature review 
highlights the theoretical framework of audit fees, examines prior studies and 
explores the regulatory framework in South Africa. Chapter 2 concludes by 
investigating the adapted fee model by Hay et al 2006. The literature review 
provides the basic theoretical underpinning and foundation of the study. 
Chapter 3 contains an overview of the methodology used in the study and 
examines the sources of data and how the data will be collected and 
analysed. The chapter also discusses the regression model. Chapter 4 
presents and discusses the regression results. Finally, chapter 5 contains a 
summary of the research report, the conclusions drawn from the research 
findings and recommendations for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
The chapter commences by reviewing relevant literature on both audit and non-audit 
service fees as well as highlighting the findings of previous studies. This is followed 
by a review of the seminal audit fee model of Simunic (1980) and a presentation of 
the adapted model as well as a discussion on the theoretical underpinning of the 
variables. The chapter concludes by taking an overall view of the regulatory 
environment in South Africa by examining the corporate governance landscape and 
the legal environment in South Africa. 
2.2 Literature review 
Recent corporate collapses at such iconic firms as Enron and WorldCom as a result 
of accounting scandals which, in most cases, implicated the auditors, have resulted 
in close scrutiny of the activities of auditors (Caneghem, 2009). In 2000, the audit 
firm, Ernst & Young, had to settle $355 million in a single shareholder lawsuit while in 
2001, the Securities & Exchange Commission brought a fraud case against Arthur 
Andersen for its involvement in the scandal at Waste Management (Coates, 2007). 
As a direct result of similar scandals, the United States of America Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 with a view to regulating the auditing 
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of public companies by introducing sweeping mandatory corporate initiatives 
(Coates, 2007).  
Since the introduction of SOX, a number of studies have focused on its impact on 
audit fees (Charles et al, 2010; Ebrahim, 2010; Griffin & Lont, 2007; Ciesielski & 
Weirich, 2006; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006). The core aim of SOX was to enhance 
the role of auditors in enforcing laws against fraud and theft in public listed 
companies by tightening the rules concerning the client-auditor relationship, auditor 
rotation and duration, the provision of non-audit services and corporate whistle-
blowing (Coates, 2007). Its implementation, however, has come under considerable 
criticism from various stakeholders (Krishnan, Krishnan, & Song, 2011).  
The compliance costs associated with SOX were regarded as fairly steep with small 
firms bearing the brunt of such costs as a result of, among other things, the auditors 
retesting items which had already been tested by management as a means of 
evaluating the management processes, and also sometimes dictating to 
management about the processes of evaluation. This often resulted in unnecessary 
cost and effort (Krishnan et al, 2011). Ebrahim (2010) contends that the impact of the 
higher audit fees resulting from the requirements of SOX could have meant an 
increasing number of clients, especially the smaller clients, downgrading to smaller 
audit firms, thus lowering audit quality. Griffin and Lont (2007) estimate that the 
incremental costs of compliance with SOX amount to approximately $1.24 billion as 
a direct consequence of altering the overall scope and quality of an audit, as well as 
related onerous disclosures and internal controls.  
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A survey carried out by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2004 found out that, as a result 
of the fact that SOX aimed at preventing deceptive accounting and curbing 
management misdemeanour by imposing stiffer sanctions for non-compliance, 59% 
of CEOs feared that overregulation posed a risk to firm growth (Zhang, 2007). SOX 
curtailed the activities of public accounting firms by prohibiting the rendering of non-
audit services such as internal audit functions to clients (Hoitash et al., 2007). Ghosh 
and Pawlewicz (2009) argue that certain of the key provisions of SOX could have 
resulted in substantial audit effort and thus, there was growing consensus among 
academics and practitioners that audit fees would increase following its passage.  
Nevertheless, SOX did result in a much tighter corporate governance environment 
over financial reporting (Ebrahim, 2010) and also brought in the following benefits, 
namely (1) motivated firms to spend money on strengthening their internal controls 
and this, in turn, (2) benefited investors directly by lowering the levels of risk losses 
and fraud, (3) increased management transparency and accountability, (4) the 
anticipated lowering of the cost of capital of firms while, (5) the economy was 
expected to benefit from both the better allocation of resources and rapid growth 
(Coates, 2007).  
In addition to those studies that focused on the effects of SOX on audit fees, other 
studies (Caneghem, 2009; Carson, Simmett, Soo, & Wright, 2012) concentrated on 
audit fees but with special attention on the fee premium associated with the big audit 
firms, the so called BIG firm audit premium.  
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2.2.1 The BIG firm audit fee premium 
Soon after the demise of Arthur Andersen in Australia, the concentration in the 
market for audit services increased thus leaving the large global audit clients with 
little choice of audit providers. This, in turn, resulted in significant increases in audit 
fees (Carson et al, 2012). According to Ebrahim (2010), the increase in audit fees 
was as a result of the fact that the large audit firms represent a niche segment of the 
audit market and this gives them the power to charge premium fees. Ebrahim (2010), 
however, maintains that it was the change in regulation, caused by SOX and the 
“Expectation Gap” of 1988 introduced by the Auditing Standards, that resulted in 
increased audit effort and, consequently, audit fees.  
Other studies have attributed the BIG Firm premium to the size of the audit firm (El-
Gammal, 2012), the size of the client (Carson et al, 2012) and the industry-specialist 
premium (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995).  
Firstly, prior studies have shown that the size of the audit firm as measured by the 
firm’s assets, market shares and the number of employees to be correlated with 
audit quality and as a result, the big audit firms are able to charge an audit fee 
premium (El-Gammal, 2012). According to Fleischer and Goettsche (2012), large 
auditors earn higher fees because of their perceived higher audit quality. This finding 
is further corroborated by a number of research studies (Carson et al, 2012; Chaney, 
Jeter, & Shivakumar, 2004; DeAngelo, 1981; Ireland & Lennox, 2002) who also 
attribute the premium to the greater expertise of the BIG firms (audit quality) as well 
as to enhanced auditor independence, varying auditor techniques and also to better 
resources required to satisfy legal claims which are available to the BIG firms as 
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compared to those available to the smaller firms. In his study, (Simunic 1980) found 
a statistically significant premium on one of the big audit firms as compared to the 
rest of the BIG 8, thus clearly confirming that the levels of premium differed even 
among the big firms. 
Secondly, Carson et al (2012) attribute client size as a determining factor that leads 
large global clients to seek the expertise and profile of the large audit firms. Carson 
(2009) believe that, in view of their large staff compliment, resources and geographic 
logistics available to handle huge client engagements, global audit firms should be 
the natural choice of auditors for such large clients. On the other hand, Carson, et al 
(2012) argue that the significant audit fees paid by large global clients are a direct 
result of limited auditor choice especially after the demise of Arthur Andersen in 
Australia. Cameran (2005) also attributes the premium not to client size but either to 
the monopolistic power of the large audit firms or to the required return on their 
reputation (Cameran, 2005). Some small firms, however, may also prefer BIG audit 
firms for a number of reasons which include lowering the cost of raising capital and 
managing the negative market perception associated with financial distress when 
switching from a BIG to a small audit firm (Dye, 1991). 
Thirdly, Craswell et al (1995) attribute the BIG firm audit fee premium to industry 
specialisation by pointing out that the processes of brand development and industry 
specialisation, with reference to the Big 8, are argued to be costly, thus resulting in 
premium fees in the region of 34% for industry specialists and 30% for a Big 8 brand 
name. In their study, Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker (2004) found that the 
smaller clients, with limited bargaining power, pay an industry-specialist premium as 
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compared to their larger counterparts. Carson et al (2012) appear to justify the fact 
that some auditing firms choose to specialise for reasons of product differentiation 
and also in order to achieve economies of scale in training and developing audit 
approaches. Nevertheless, research findings on whether industry specialisation 
results in a fee premium have not been conclusive in any one direction (Carson et al, 
2012).    
2.2.2 Relationship between audit and non-audit fees 
Other studies on audit fees have focused on the relationship between audit fees and 
non-audit fees, for example studies conducted by Simunic (1984; Palmrose (1986); 
De Berg, Kaplan, and Pany (1991); and Davis et al (1993), as well as Bell, 
Landsman, and Shackleford (2001), cited by Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and 
Raghunandan (2003). These research studies were motivated by the suggestion that 
knowledge spill-overs existed between the provision of both audit and non-audit 
services and as a result, the determination of both fees took place simultaneously. It 
was then possible that this simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees 
could result in a biased estimation of the relationship between the two fees in single-
equation models of both audit and non-audit fees (Whisenant et al, 2003).   
Other studies also reported a significant positive association between audit and non-
audit service fees, thus suggesting the existence of knowledge spill-overs between 
the two services (Bell et al, 2001; DeBerg et al, 1991; Davis et al, 1993; Palmrose, 
1986; Simunic, 1984; Whisenant et al, 2003). Beck, Frecka and Solomon (1988a; 
1988b) attribute this relationship to the differential benefits that arise from the 
provision of recurring non-audit services to the auditee. In fact, Jeppesen (1998), 
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cited by Ezzamel, Gwilliam, and Holland (2002), argues that the distinction between 
audit and non-audit services has become increasingly blurred as a result of 
accounting firms emphasing the value added by an audit.  
In his (Simunic, 1984) later study, using a single equation estimation audit fee model, 
he proved that the cost functions of audit and non-audit service fees were not 
independent and concluded that the significant positive association between the two 
was the result of knowledge spill-overs between the two services. Simunic (1984) 
believes that cost efficiencies arise from reducing the fixed or marginal costs of 
either of the two services or of both. Hay et al (2006) point out that the internal 
dynamics in audit firms regarding partner remuneration has a bearing on the 
relationship between the two fees. Situations such as when an auditee purchases 
both audit and non-audit services may give rise to the arbitrary allocation of fees in 
the books of the auditee while there may also be incentives for the audit partners to 
misclassify the non-audit fees by classifying them with audit fees (Hay et al, 2006).  
On the contrary, not all studies have found positive relationships between the two 
fees with Barfield, Gover, & O'Keefe (1993), Abdel-Khalik (1990) and O'Keefe, 
Simunic, & Stein (1994) reporting no significant relationship although Palmrose 
(1986) reported a weak, but statistically, significant relationship.  
Obstacles to the study of the relationship between the two fees have been identified 
as: (1) arising from the possibility of differing interactions according to the nature of 
the service provided; and, (2) the perception of spillover effects where the non-audit 
services are provided by parties other than the incumbent auditor (Ezzamel et al, 
2002). Other complications include possible time lags in any relationship such as the 
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one found between the introduction of a new management system, which would 
render an audit cheaper in the long term, but more expensive initially as a result of 
the additional work involved in ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the system 
(Ezzamel et al, 2002).  
Regulators have always been wary of the effect of the relationship between the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services on the independence of auditors (Ghosh, 
Kallapur, & Moon, 2009) with debates on the issue taking place in the United States 
of America, Australia and internationally (Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002). Umar 
and Anandarajan (2004) argue that the provision of non-audit services to clients 
increases the audit firm’s economic dependence, rendering the firm incapable of, for 
example, disclosing possible aggressive accounting methods on the part of the 
client. This is because of the additional economic incentive to retain the client which, 
in turn, results in substantially increased threat to auditor independence (Basioudis, 
Papakonstantinou, & Geiger, 2008).  
On the other hand, Lennox (1999) argues that the provision of non-audit services 
increases the auditors’ knowledge of the client through the auditors’ knowledge of 
any spill-over effects, thus enhancing the probability of detecting problems. Habib 
and Islam (2007) contend that all fees create economic bonding between the auditor 
and client. Nevertheless, prior research has not been conclusive in proving a 
negative association between non-audit services and audit quality (Kinney, Palmrose 
& Scholz, 2004; Omer, Bedard & Falsetta, 2006). 
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2.3 The seminal audit fee model of Simunic (1980)  
According to Caneghem (2010), studies on audit fees are typically modelled on the 
seminal work conducted by Simunic (1980) whose seminal study is reviewed in the 
following paragraphs. Dan A. Simunic was associate professor at the University of 
British Columbia, Canada where he conducted his seminal study as part of his 
doctoral thesis with the University of Chicago in 1979. The study aimed to provide 
evidence that price competition existed in the market for the audits of public or listed 
companies regardless of the share of the market segment serviced by the BIG 8 
firms. The research data consisted of 397 observations on audit fees and related 
variables obtained from listed companies in 1977. The sample size was based on 
both an informal assessment of the marginal benefits and costs of sampling and on 
an expected response rate of 30 to 40%. 
Simunic’s model included two dependent variables namely FEE (amount of current 
year’s external audit fee) and ICOST (current year’s salaries paid to internal 
auditors) while the independent variables were divided into three categories. The first 
category comprised of control variables for differences in loss exposure and included 
the auditee’s ASSETS (Total assets at year-end), SUBS (Number of consolidated 
subsidiaries), DIVERS (Number of industry segments in which the auditee operates), 
FORGN (Foreign assets divided by total assets at year-end), RECV (Accounts, loans 
and notes receivable divided by total assets at year-end), and INV (Inventories 
divided by total assets at year-end). 
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The second category comprised of control variables for differences in the assessed 
loss-sharing ratio or alternative measures for auditee financial distress, represented 
by PROFITS (Net Income divided by total assets), LOSS (dummy variable of 1 if 
auditee had incurred a loss in any one of the previous three fiscal years, otherwise 
0), and SUBJ (dummy variable of 1 if auditee had received a “subject to” qualified 
opinion, otherwise 0). The third category comprised of control variables for 
differences in the auditor production functions and included AUDITOR (dummy 
variable of 1 if auditor were a Big 8 firm, otherwise 0) and TIME (number of years 
auditee had used the current auditor).   
Using a series of least squares regressions at the 95% confidence level, the study 
proved that all the control variables for differences in the loss exposure group were 
statistically significant in determining the level of audit fees but not the internal audit 
costs. Accordingly, the study accepted the hypothesis that liability avoidance was a 
major consideration in the design of financial reporting systems. The PROFIT 
variable was insignificant while the dummy variables LOSS and SUBJ were both 
significant, thus proving that the auditor’s perception of residual liability losses 
appears to increase with evidence of significant deterioration in the auditee’s 
operations or future. The study also proved and concluded that price competition 
prevailed throughout the market for audit services. 
The next section will examine the fee model and its variables. 
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2.4 The audit fee model and the variables 
Since the seminal study conducted by Simunic (1980), the majority of audit fee 
models tend either to replicate the same model or to incorporate some minor 
modifications. The model used for the purposes of this research study was an 
adaptation of the model proposed by Hay et al (2006) and is as folows: 
Ln(AUDFEE)it =  α + β1Ln(NASFEE)it + β2Ln(TA)it + β3INVRECit + β4SQRTSUBit + β5ROAit 
+ β6(TD/TA)it + β7(CA/CL)it + β8BIG4it + ϵit    
where:  
Ln(AUDFEE)  Natural log of audit fees; 
Ln(NASFEE)  Natural log of non-audit service fees; 
Ln(TA)  Natural log of total assets; 
INVREC Ratio of the sum of inventory and accounts receivable to total 
assets; 
SQRTSUB Square root of the number of subsidiaries; 
ROA Ratio of EBIT to total assets; 
TD/TA Ratio of total debt to total assets; 
CA/CL Ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
BIG4 Big 4 audit firms in South Africa being 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young and Deloitte; 
ϵ The error term, representing either a fee discount or premium. 
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The theoretical underpinning of the variables is discussed below. The variables may 
be divided into two broad categories representing either client attributes or audit firm 
attributes.  
Client size is regarded as the most dominant determinant of audit fees (Caneghem, 
2009; Charles et al, 2010; Hay et al, 2006) with size accounting for almost 70% of 
the cross-sectional variation in audit fees (Charles et al, 2010). As a result of their 
size, large firms require more audit effort as they typically have more transactions, 
larger balances, attract more public scrutiny as well as higher agency and political 
costs (Carnegem, 2009) and, therefore, they present a higher risk to the auditor 
(Naser & Nuseibeh, 2007). In addition, it would appear that the stock of assets is a 
better measure of exposure to the possibility of a firm making a loss as compared to 
an accounting flow measure such as revenue. Accordingly, several lawsuits have 
traditionally been linked to deficiencies in asset valuation (Simunic, 1980). 
Receivables and inventories represent potentially greater loss exposure as they 
require specific auditing procedures while their valuation is a complex task which 
requires a forecast of future events (Simunic, 1980; Caneghem, 2009;  Blankley et 
al, 2012). The complexity is a result of the nature of the transactions, the accounting 
standards on recognition and measurement and the professional judgement required 
to assess probable future outcomes  (Thinggaard & Kiertzner, 2008). Simunic (1980) 
classifies receivables and inventories as comprising part of investments that are 
difficult-to-audit and are associated with companies that purchase management 
advisory services.  
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Complexity is represented by the number of subsidiaries in the audit fee model. As 
observed by Ireland and Lennox (2002), the distinction between complex and risky 
audits is somewhat blurred in view of the fact that complex audits pose higher levels 
of risk to the auditor in as much as risk may also emanate from other sources. 
Greater diversification and the decentralisation of the financial reporting entity points 
to higher loss exposure as a result of a number of dispersed decision centres 
(Simunic, 1980) as well as the increased volume of work and increased complexity 
associated with the entity’s consolidated accounts (Ireland & Lennox, 2002). A 
greater number of subsidiaries also imply greater amount and scope of work in 
consolidation such as the elimination of inter-group transactions  (Pong & 
Whittington, 1994).     
Return on assets represents a measure of profitability. According to Charles et al, 
(2010) profitability measures the extent to which an auditor is exposed to liability  in 
the event of the client becoming insolvent.  Caneghem (2009) maintains that audit 
fees should be higher for poorly performing clients as such clients present a higher 
risk to the auditor. In their study, Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor (2012) included the 
return on assets variable as a control for audit risk. 
Caneghem (2009) included the current ratio in his study as a proxy for short- term 
liquidity while Blankley et al (2012) included it as a control for audit risk. According to 
Simunic (1980), both leverage and liquidity represent the risk of an auditee failing 
and this inevitably potentially exposes the auditor to a loss.  
Lastly, the size of the audit firm represents a factor in fee determination (Jaggi & 
Low, 2011). While the demand and suppy of audit services are both regarded as the 
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basic factors that determine audit fees (Simunic, 1980), on the supply side, factors 
such as the size of the audit firm, its resources, industry specialisation and audit 
quality as proxied by the BIG 4 play a significant role (Jaggi & Low, 2011). Certain 
studies have documented the fact that the BIG 4 charge a premium for their 
perceived higher quality audit services (Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; 
Ireland & Lennox, 2002) although other studies have failed to provide evidence to 
affirm these findings (Chaney et al, 2004; Seetharaman, Gul, & Lynn, 2002).  
In concluding the literature review section, the last section will examine the 
regulatory environment in South Africa and will include the development of corporate 
governance in South Africa especially as regards the aspect of IR. Sections in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 which relate to auditing and are relevant to this research 
study will also be covered.  
2.5 The regulatory environment in South Africa  
According to KPMG International (2012), it is incumbent on organisations in South 
Africa to meet their regulatory reporting requirements as stipulated in King-III, the 
Companies Act of 2008, International Financial Reporting Standards and the JSE 
Listing requirements as well as in terms of certain non-mandatory frameworks such 
as the Global Reporting Initiative, JSE Socially Responsible Index and others. The 
following section will focus on corporate governance in South Africa and, in 
particular, on integrated reporting as recommended in King-III as well as relevant 
provisions in the Companies Act of 2008. The section will conclude with a brief 
review of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005.  
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2.5.1 Corporate governance in South Africa 
South Africa re-entered the global economy in 1994 after the collapse of the 
apartheid government. In order to enable South African companies to compete in the 
global arena, it was imperative that the companies had to embrace improved 
standards of corporate governance (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). In general, South 
African corporate structures resemble those of the United Kingdom as company law 
in South Africa was strongly influenced by the English Companies (Consolidation) 
Act of 1908 (West, 2009). The first corporate governance report, popularly referred 
to as King-I, was issued in 1994 under the chairmanship of Mervyn King and, 
following the release of the Cadbury Report in 1992 (West, 2009). King-I covered 
same issues as the Cadbury Report with special attention to the board of directors 
and protection of shareholders, but with very little attention being paid to non-
financial matters and engagement with stakeholders (West, 2009). 
In 2002, the second code of corporate governance in South Africa, King-II, was 
released. Its release was influenced by changes in the labour laws. In addition, it 
represented a response to accounting standards and developments in business in 
general. King-II emphasised the concept of stakeholders as opposed to the 
emphasis in King-I on shareholders (Gstraunthaler, 2010), and also addressed many 
of the corporate governance issues which had been highlighted in wake of the 
collapse of companies such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, among others 
(West, 2009). In addition, King-II also recommended the notion of sustainability 
reporting although it was to be done separately from financial reporting (IOD, 2009). 
Again, as a result of changes in legislation, particularly the new Companies Act 71 of 
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2008, and in order to keep pace with international developments, King-II was revised 
with the release of King-III with effect from 1 March 2010 (IOD, 2009). 
King-III focuses on three pillars namely leadership, sustainability and corporate 
citizenship (Gstraunthaler, 2010). Included in other changes to King-II, King-III 
introduced the concept of Integrated Reporting (IR) and, in fact, dedicates the whole 
of chapter 9 to the subject (IOD,2009). The following section will focus on the 
concept of IR. 
2.5.2 Integrated reporting (IR) 
The market capitalisation of a listed company equals its economic value and not its 
book value as the purchasers of stock assess the quality of the company’s risk 
management and the way in which the company approaches sustainability issues 
pertinent to the business (IOD, 2009). Today’s investors require forward-looking 
information and hence it is imperative that companies do win the trust and 
confidence of their stakeholders by issuing integrated reports. These in turn help 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the economic value of a company 
(IOD, 2009).  
The integrated report contains both financial and sustainability information as 
recommended in King-III. Thus, in accordance with King-III, financial disclosure 
includes (1) the annual financial statements (2) the board’s commentary on the 
financial results – this should be sufficiently comprehensive to enable stakeholders 
to make an informed assessment of the company’s economic value by disclosing the 
company’s prospects as regards unlocking value in future, as well as the board’s 
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assessment of the key risks facing the company, and, (3) the board’s assessment of 
the going-concern status of the company and if there are any concerns, the board 
should disclose the reasons and steps it is taking to remedy the situation (IOD, 
2009). 
As regards sustainability disclosure, the report should (1) disclose how the company 
has made its money by placing the financial results into context by reporting on both 
the negative and positive impact the company’s operations would have had on its 
stakeholders with a view to consolidating the positives and eliminating the negatives 
in the future (2) be holistic and report in an integrated manner on the strategic 
choices made by the board in the triple context of economic, social and 
environmental issues (3) recognise that sustainability (also known as non-financial) 
reporting is a critical element of reporting, and is increasingly formalised and 
sophisticated  as is evident in the Global Reporting Initiative G3 guidelines and the 
ISO standard (26000) on social responsibility; and (4) recognise that sustainability 
parameters are not as standardised as is the case with financial reporting and 
therefore , it is essential that all performance indicators be clearly explained in terms 
of their implications and with reference to known benchmarks. The JSE Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) index criteria could be used as a guiding framework 
(IOD, 2009). 
King-III also recommends that the board obtains assurance over the financial 
disclosure in the integrated report as King-III acknowledges that the assurance in 
respect of sustainability performance and reporting is more complex as is the case 
with financial reporting IOD, 2009).   
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The formalised review of the process of Integrated Reporting is contained in a 
discussion paper which was issued by the Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC) of 
South Africa for public comment by 25 April 2011. The salient features of the 
document are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
In the introduction to the discussion paper, IRC (2011) indicate that current reporting 
is backward-looking and thus it fails to provide stakeholders with the information 
required to make a meaningful assessment of a company’s ability both to create and 
sustain value in future. The JSE Listings Requirements  
“require companies…to issue an integrated report for financial years starting on or 
after 1 March 2010, or to explain why they are not doing so” IRC (2011). 
According to IRC (2011), the benefits of IR include the following: (1) the leadership of 
the organisation gains an in-depth knowledge of the organisation’s strategy and also 
how the company interacts with environmental, social, financial and economic 
issues; (2) a holistic picture of the organisation is provided which is useful to 
stakeholders in their making an informed assessment of the firm’s ability to create 
and sustain value; (3) engender significant trust in the firm as a result of the 
transparency displayed in the report; (4) enhances risk-management strategies; (5) 
lowers the cost of capital as a result of the leadership of the company demonstrating 
to investors the company’s effectiveness; (6) realise cost savings and process 
efficiencies by identifying resource constraints; (7) inculcate a culture of innovation 
and readiness to exploit new business opportunities; and, (8) ensures improved 
competitiveness in the market-place and enhanced brand value. 
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In order to increase credibility of the disclosure of the organisation’s activities with 
regard to the accuracy, completeness and reliability of financial, social, 
environmental, economic or governance information, it is recommended that the 
report receives independent assurance (IOD, 2009; IRC, 2011). Nevertheless, the 
requirements for assurance in respect of the company’s financial reporting remain 
unchanged regardless of the independent assurance of the report (IRC, 2011). Thus 
King-III recommends that the audit committee, as a board committee, should engage 
the external auditors to provide assurance on the summarised financial information 
in addition to independent assurance as regards the sustainability section of the 
report (IRC, 2011). The external auditors would report on such aspects in 
accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). It is recommended 
by King-III that the strategy for providing assurance in respect of the integrated 
report should adhere to the principles of a combined model which take into account 
the assurance provided by management, the internal audit, the external audit, and 
any other external assurance providers, for example, for ISO and BEE certifications 
(IRC, 2011).   
The IRC (2011) advises organisations to engage their auditors as well as other 
external and internal assurance providers at an early stage in order to determine in 
advance those areas of the report which will be subject to either an audit or 
assurance as well as the applicable financial reporting and sustainability or quality 
frameworks to be applied. Nonetheless, “developing the ideal integrated report will 
be a journey for many organisations and so will the extent and level of assurance” 
(IRC, 2011).  
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2.5.3 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) 
The opening sentence of King-III links the corporate governance code and the Act by 
stating that the former “became necessary because of the new Companies Act 
No.71 of 2008 (‘the Act’) and changes in international governance trends” (IOD, 
2009). As pointed out by King-III (IOD, 2009), the governance of corporations may 
either be on a statutory basis (Companies Act, SOX) or on a voluntary basis through 
a code of principles and practices such as stipulated in King-III. King-III (IOD, 2009) 
further states that there is always a link between good governance and compliance 
with the law and, thus, it is not possible to separate the two. A comparison between 
the Act and King-III on the aspect of auditors will help to put into context this 
important corporate governance link.  
Sections 90 to 94 of the Act deal with the appointment, resignation, rotation and 
rights of auditors respectively. King-II was the first code to recommend practices in 
respect of the appointment of auditors in 2002 and, subsequently, when the Act was 
revised in 2008, the provisions regarding the appointment of auditors were also 
incorporated and thus became mandatory for public companies. 
Specific comparisons between the Act and King-III include the following: Section 90 
of the Act requires a company to appoint audit committee members who must 
include at least three members with the necessary qualifications and experience, 
and must also be non-executive directors. King-III complements the Act by further 
recommending that the audit committee members appointed should also be 
independent.    
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In terms of section 90 of the Act, companies are required to appoint auditors. The 
appointed auditor is expected, amongst other criteria, to be approved by the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (King-III), in the case of listed companies and must 
also be acceptable to the company’s audit committee (Companies Act, section 90.2).   
Both the Act and King-III include specific provisions to guard against the erosion of 
auditor independence with the Act, in section 90(2), prescribing that an appointed 
auditor must not either be or do the following: (1) be a director or prescribed officer of 
the company; (2) be an employee or consultant company who has been engaged for 
more than a year in the maintenance of the company’s financial records or 
statements; (3) be a person who alone, or with partners or employees, regularly 
performs the duties of an accountant or bookkeeper or related secretarial work for 
the company; (4) may not perform any duties that would place the auditor in a 
conflict of interest situation as prescribed by the Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors; and lastly, (5) may not perform any duties as determined by the company’s 
audit committee. Section 92 further prescribes the rotation of auditors by requiring 
that an auditor shall not serve the same company for more than five consecutive 
years. In addition, section 93 of the Act also empowers auditors by conferring certain 
rights on them such as the right to apply to a court of law to enforce a company to 
allow the auditor access to accounting records and the right to attend any ordinary 
shareholder’s meetings.  
Apart from the specific provisions directed at the auditors in terms of their 
qualifications and conduct as outlined above, both the Act and King-III also ascribe 
statutory and fiduciary roles to the audit committee as regards to regulating the 
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activities and status of auditors. In the first instance, the Act in section 90 provides 
for public companies to have in place an audit committee as a statutory committee 
as opposed to the other board committees that King-III recommends as best 
practice.  
The statutory roles of the audit committee include the nominations for appointment of 
a registered auditor who, in their opinion, is independent of the company, 
determining the auditors fees and terms of engagement as well as determining the 
nature and extent of any non-audit services that the auditor may provide or any 
service that the auditor may not offer to the company (Companies Act, section 94.7). 
King-III (IOD, 2009) further recommends that the audit committee defines the policy 
for the provision of non-audit services and the approval of such contracts. It is also 
recommended that all members of the committee should be non-executive directors 
and that the committee should meet at least once a year with both the internal and 
external auditors, but without the presence of management (IOD, 2009).   
In concluding this chapter, a synopsis of the regulation of auditors in terms of the 
Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 follows in the next section. 
2.5.4 The Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 (APA) 
The APA makes provision for the establishment of the IRBA, a body which controls 
that aspect of the accountancy profession that is involved with the public sector in 
the Republic of South Africa. The public sector includes listed companies.  
The functions of the IRBA include taking measures to promote the integrity of the 
auditing profession and prescribing the minimum requirements for the accreditation 
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and registration of auditors. The IRBA is also responsible for investigating alleged 
improper conduct and taking necessary disciplinary action, conducting practice 
reviews as well as setting the annual fees of registered auditors.    
The IRBA reports to the Minister of Finance in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act (Auditing Profession Act, 2005). The establishment of this body in 
South Africa is consistent with other forms of oversight bodies in countries such as 
Ireland, England, America, Australia and Canada (Odendaal & De Jager, 2008).  
The IRBA was born out of a need to regulate the auditing profession which had been 
largely self-regulating world-wide prior to the world debacles which included 
companies such as Enron (Odendaal & de Jager, 2008). Thereafter, other attempts 
were made to restructure and regulate the profession in South Africa in the form of 
bodies and acts such as (1) the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board Act of 1991; 
(2) The Accountancy Profession Bill of 1997; (3) the Draft Accountancy Bill of 2001; 
(4) the Nel Commission Report of 2002 and finally (5) the Auditing Profession Act of 
2005. The IRBA, which replaced the Public Accountants’ and Auditors Board, was 
established in terms of the APA (Odendaal & De Jager, 2008).  
The independence of the IRBA has been questioned by some critics because 
approximately 40% of its members come from the audit profession but however, this 
has been countered by the fact that the independence of the IRBA is enhanced by 
the fact that the Auditor General represents the Minister of Finance on the board and 
that the members are appointed by the Minister for a maximum period of two years 
(Odendaal & De Jager, 2008).   
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2.6 Summary 
The chapter commenced by highlighting the events that led to the enactment of SOX 
in America such as corporate governance failures at Enron and WorldCom. The 
benefits and criticisms of SOX then followed. Some of its benefits included the 
tightening of the corporate governance environment over reporting, the 
enhancement of the role of auditors in stemming fraud and theft and the 
strengthening of internal controls in firms. SOX came under fire for (1) raising 
compliance costs especially for the small firms, (2) and because of higher costs, 
resulted in smaller firms downgrading to smaller audit firms, and (3) curtailing the 
activities of public accounting firms in offering services in the area of non-audit 
services such as internal auditing. 
In section 2.2.1, a review of the literature on the BIG firm audit fee premium was 
undertaken. On the global setting, the demise of Arthur Andersen in Australia 
increased the concentration in the market for audit services. This led to an increase 
in audit fees due to a niche segment that was created for the BIG firms. Other 
reasons cited for the increase in audit fees included (1) the change in regulation 
such as SOX and the Expectation Gap of 1988 (introduced by the Auditing 
Standards), (2) the size of the audit firm, (3) the size of the client, and 4) industry 
specialisation. The various variables such as assets and number of employees that 
determine both client and audit firm size were also covered.    
The relationship between audit fees and non-audit services was explored in section 
2.2.2. A number of studies hypothesised that the provision of both audit and non-
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audit service fees resulted in knowledge spill-overs and, as a result, concluded that 
the determination of the fees was done simultaneously. Simunic (1984) believes that 
the cost efficiencies arise from the reduction of fixed or marginal costs of either of the 
two services or of both. On the contrary, a number of studies also documented the 
negative effects of the provision of the two services as leading to an erosion of 
auditor independence because of the additional economic incentives exerted on the 
auditor to retain the client, which leads the auditor not to disclose all the accounting 
irregularities. 
In section 2.3, the seminal audit fee model by Simunic (1980) was analysed by 
looking at the model variables, leading to a review of the audit fee model for this 
research study in section 2.4. The chapter concludes by looking at the regulatory 
environment tin South Africa by specifically focusing on corporate governance, 
integrated reporting, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the Auditing Profession Act 
26 of 2005.
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter revisits the purpose of the research study as well as presenting the 
research questions and research hypotheses. The chapter also contains an overview 
of the research methodology used in the study to address the research questions 
and research hypotheses. In addition, the chapter discusses specific areas dealing 
with the population and study sample, the sources of the data, the data collection as 
well as how the data will be managed and analysed. In conclusion, the chapter 
addresses the measures that were adopted to address the issues of the validity and 
reliability of the research results.  
3.2 Research purpose and research questions 
The purpose of the research was to evaluate whether the BIG4 audit firms were 
charging an audit fee premium as a result of the recommendations of King-III on 
integrated reporting for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
Accordingly, the study sought to provide answers to the following questions: 
3.2.1 Research question 1 and hypotheses 
Post King-III, were the BIG4 audit firms in South Africa charging an audit fee 
premium in response to the recommendations of the code on integrated reporting?  
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H0: Post King-III, there was no evidence that the BIG4 audit firms were charging 
an audit fee premium in response to the recommendations of the code on integrated 
reporting. 
H1: Post King-III, there was evidence that the BIG4 audit firms were charging an 
audit fee premium in response to the recommendations of the code on integrated 
reporting. 
3.2.2 Research question 2 and hypotheses 
Was there a relation between audit fees and non-audit service fees? 
H0: Post King-III, there was no significant relation between audit and non-audit 
service fees. 
H1: Post King-III, there was a significant relation between audit and non-audit 
service fees. 
3.3 Overview of research method 
The study adopted a quantitative research approach with multiple regression 
analysis (MRA) and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) as the primary statistical 
techniques. Factor analysis will also be employed as a secondary tool to illustrate 
the existence of a relationship between audit fees and non-audit service fees. MRA 
was chosen because the technique enables a researcher to model a data set for 
predicting an outcome variable from one or more independent variables (Zikmund, 
2003). The regression equation is commonly referred to as the model. The two types 
of models used included the yearly cross-sectional regressions for the years 2007 to 
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2012 and a pooled regression for the entire period under study. The pooled model 
was the main model while the former regressions were run to provide some 
perspective on the results and to corroborate the research results. The models were 
run in SPSS using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
The regressions models highlighted the relationship between audit fees, as the 
dependent variable, and non-audit service fees as the independent variable, together 
with other control variables that represent both client and audit firm characteristics. 
An audit fee model developed by Hay, Knechel and Li (2006) was adapted to suit the 
purpose of the research study as follows: (1) the OPINION variable was excluded as 
it was not one of the research objectives, (2) the LISTED variable was excluded 
altogether because the research sample consisted solely of listed companies, and 
(3) the BIG5 variable was substituted with a BIG4 variable, representing the number 
of the large international audit firms in South Africa. Unlike in the study by Hay et al 
(2006) where the BIG5 auditors were represented by a dummy variable of 1 if the 
firm was a member of the BIG5 and 0 (zero) if not, in this research study, each of the 
BIG4 auditor firms constituted a variable on its own and these were designated as 
FIRM1 to FIRM4. The main reason for disaggregating the BIG4 was to obtain a 
better understanding of which audit firm or firms among the BIG4 group was/were 
responsible for charging a premium. 
Cross-sectional financial data for all the companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) as at 31 October 2012 were downloaded from the OSIRIS 
financial database for the fiscal years 2007 to 2012. The data was pulled as at the 
end of the financial year end of every company in each of the years.  
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Excel was used to convert the data into SPSS-compatible format after which the 
data were fed directly into SPSS statistical package in order to run the regression 
models. A total of seven models were run and these fell into two categories. The first 
category consisted of six yearly cross-sectional regression models for each of the 
years 2007 to 2012. The reason for the cross-sectional estimation was because the 
dependent variable, AUDFEE, is said to be serially correlated (Ebrahim, 2010). This 
is corroborated by Hoitash et al. (2007), who estimated regressions separately for 
each year to avoid t-statistics being “unduly estimated due to time-series correlation.” 
The six models tracked the existence of a BIG4 firm fee premium in the absence of 
the King3 variable. The second category, which comprised of the pooled model, 
assessed the impact of the recommendations of King-III on integrated reporting. In 
the latter model, the data was partitioned into two periods, namely, (1) the pre-King-
III era from 1 January 2007 to 28 February 2010 and (2) the post-King-III from 1 
March 2010 to 31 October 2012.  
In line with the adapted model of Hay et al (2006), the models incorporated 
independent variables which controlled for client size, complexity of the audit, audit 
effort, client risk, client profitability and liquidity. The models and their respective 
variables were as follows: 
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Cross-sectional models for years 2007 to 2012: 
Ln(AUDFEE)it =  α + β1Ln(NASFEE)it + β2Ln(TA)it + β3INVRECit + β4SQRTSUBit + β5ROAit 
+ β6(TD/TA)it + β7(CA/CL)it + β8BIG4it + ϵit    
The pooled model: 
Ln(AUDFEE)it =  α + β1Ln(NASFEE)it + β2Ln(TA)it + β3INVRECit + β4SQRTSUBit + β5ROAit 
+ β6(TD/TA)it + β7(CA/CL)it + β8BIG4it + β9King3 + ϵit    
Where;  
Ln(AUDFEE)  Natural log of audit fees; 
Ln(NASFEE)  Natural log of non-audit service fees; 
Ln(TA)  Natural log of total assets; 
INVREC Ratio of the sum of inventory and accounts receivable to total 
assets; 
SQRTSUB Square root of the number of subsidiaries; 
ROA Ratio of EBIT to total assets; 
TD/TA Ratio of total debt to total assets; 
CA/CL Ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
BIG4 A dummy variable of 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 audit 
firms (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young and 
Deloitte) in South Africa, otherwise 0 (zero); 
King3 A dummy variable of 1 if the data is post-King-III, otherwise 0; 
ϵ The error term, representing either a fee discount or a premium. 
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The variables were consistent with prior research by Ireland and Lennox (2002), 
Cameran (2005) and Hay et al (2006). Regression diagnostic tests were carried out 
to ensure that the models did not violate the assumptions of MRA as regards 
linearity, independence of errors, homoskedasticity of the errors and the normality of 
the distribution of the errors. Limited by the availability of complete data, the size of 
the regression models varied in size from year to year with the number of 
observations being 93 in 2007, 166 in 2008, 172 in 2009, 163 in 2010, 143 in 2011 
and 48 in 2012.  
In order to mitigate the shortcomings of a small sample in 2012, the concept of 
bootstrapping (Efron, 1979) was employed. Bootstrapping is a computer-intensive 
resampling method which draws repeated samples of the same size from the 
population of interest. In this respect, the re-sampling process was repeated 1000 
times.  
3.3.1 Assumptions of multiple regression analysis (MRA)  
MRA is a statistical technique for modelling the relationship between variables 
although it does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship (Montgomery, Peck, & 
Vining, 2006). There are four assumptions that must be met in order to be able to 
draw inferences from a regression model. According to Sheather (2009), these 
include the following: (1) there must be a linear relationshp between the dependent 
variable/s (Y1…n) and the independent variable/s (X1…n); (2) the errors must be 
independent of each other; (3) the errors must have a common variance 
(homoskedaciticity); and (4) the errors must be normally distributed with a mean of 0.     
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In order to ensure the linearity of data by limiting the effect of both outliers and 
leverage points, the variables AUDFEE, NASFEE and TA were transformed into their 
natural logarithmic form while the number of subsidiaries variable (SQRTSUB) was 
transformed into its square root form. The transformation of certain variables was 
necessary as this ensured that the error of variances became constant (Sheather, 
2009). The linearity of both the dependent and independent variables was tested by 
observing scatter plots of standardized residuals against the predicted values. A 
non-discernible pattern in the plots of the residuals would indicated that the models 
were valid (refer appendices 1a to 1g).  
In order to address the problem of the data collected from one year to the other 
becoming serially correlated, also termed autocorrelation, and which would violate 
the assumption of the independence of errors, the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated 
in SPSS was observed. The values of the Durbin-Watson statistic range from 0 to 4 
and as a general rule, the residuals are uncorrelated if the value is approximately 2, 
a value close to 0 indicates a strong negative correlation while a value of 4 indicates 
a strong positive correlation. 
Another critical assumption of regression analysis is that the errors must have 
constant variance otherwise all the inferential statistics such as p-values, confidence 
intervals and prediction intervals are rendered invalid (Sheather, 2009). The violation 
of this assumption is referred to as the heterogeneity of variance or 
heteroscedasticity (Gamst, Meyers, & Guarino, 2008). The problem, however, may 
be overcome by methods such as the transformation of data. Accordingly, certain 
variables were transformed into their square root or natural logarithmic forms. In 
52 
 
order to test for homoscedasticity, scatterplot of the standardised residuals were 
plotted against the predicted values of the audit fees. The results thereof are shown 
in appendices 1a to 1g. Any pattern formed by the plots would have indicated the 
existence of heteroscedasticity.    
The normality of errors was tested by using a normal probability plot (P-P) of the 
standardised residuals and the histograms of the residuals (refer appendices 1a to 
1g). Plots in an almost straight line were assumed to be evidence of data consistent 
with that from a normal distribution. In the case of a histogram, the empirical 
distribution of the data should be bell-shaped and it should resemble the normal 
distribution. 
Lastly, multicollinearity was observed through Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
computed by SPSS. Multicollinearity is a situation which arises in regression analysis 
when strong correlations exist among the independent variables. This may, in turn, 
result in incorrect regression coefficient signs and statistically insignificant 
independent variables despite the fact that the F-test may be highly significant. Five 
is the acceptable cut-off point often used in practice (Sheather, 2009) and implies 
that any VIF above 5 is indicative of strong correlation between the respective 
variables, which in turn leads to poorly estimated regression coefficients (Sheather, 
2009).   
3.3.2 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA is a statistical technique which is used to evaluate the size of differences 
between two or more sets of data (Gamst et al, 2008). This technique was used to 
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test the research hypotheses and to decide whether to accept or reject the null 
hypotheses. In order to test the hypotheses, ANOVA computes an F ratio which 
divides the area under the F distribution into two parts: one containing 95% of the 
area (the region in which the null hypothesis is accepted as true) and the other 5% of 
the area (the region in which the null hypothesis is rejected) (Gamst et al, 2008). The 
probability level at the point of separation of the two parts is known as the alpha level 
or statistical significance level with ratios falling under the 5% (.05) area being 
referred to as statistically significant. The alpha level of .05 is standard across 
scientific disciplines (Gamst et al, 2008) and was therefore used for running ANOVA 
in SPSS for the purposes of this study. 
According to Gamst et al (2008), ANOVA analysis assumes the following three 
assumptions namely: (1) the error components of the of the scores of the dependent 
variable are independent of each other, (2) the errors are normally distributed and, 
(3) the variances across the groups of the independent variable are equal. The way 
in which these three assumptions were addressed was explained in section 3.3.1 
and the results of the tests are shown in appendices 1a to 1g. 
3.3.3 Measure of association – the Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient (r) is a statistical measure of the covariation or 
association between two variables assuming any values between +.1.0 to -1.0 
(Zikmund, 2003). If the value of r is 1.0 this means that there is a perfect positive 
linear or straight line relation between the variables while at the other extreme end, 
an r value of -1.0 signifies a perfect negative linear relationship or a perfect inverse 
relationship. An r value of 0 is indicative of the absence of a relationship between the 
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variables. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient was therefore used to measure the 
relationship between audit and non-audit service fees. 
3.3.4 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is applied in reducing a mass of information to an economical 
description or to define relationships and/or to make inferences (Rummel, 1970). The 
technique was used as a secondary means to test the relationship between audit 
fees and non-audit service fees by determining whether they fall into a similar 
component or factor. Factor analyses are carried out by examining the pattern of 
correlations, whether negatively or positively, between the observed variables with 
highly correlated variables interpreted as likely to be influenced by the same factors 
(De Coster, 1998). The interpretation of factor loadings against a variable is usually 
by rule of thumb, with loadings ranging from as low as 0.40 and as high as 0.70 and 
above being interpreted as represented by the respective factor. Results of factor 
analysis are shown in table 4.9.   
3.4 Population and study sample 
Zikmund (2003) defines a population or universe as a complete group of entities that 
shares some common set of characteristics. For the purposes of this research study, 
the financial statements and data of all the JSE-listed companies constituted the 
relevant population as at 31 October 2012, the date of downloading the data. On this 
date, there were 527 listed companies on the OSIRIS database, and depending on 
the date of the listing of the company, all the financial statements were available. 
Although, if a company had, for example, been listed only in the previous two years, 
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then the database would still bring up the company name in all the years of inquiry 
but it would then populate the data fields with zero values for the years the company 
had not yet either been listed or included on the database. Thus, a total of 3 162 
records were downloaded into Ms Excel representing the six years from 2007 to 
2012.  
In certain instances, some of the company records did not contain all the information 
required for this study and, thus, it was necessary to adopt a particular sampling 
method. As observed by Welman and Kruger (2001), most research projects rely on 
samples due to the size of the population which renders it impractical and 
uneconomical to involve all the members of the population. While there are 
advantages to sampling which include lower costs compared to dealing with an 
entire population as well as less labour requirements, sampling does, however, lend 
itself to the disadvantages of sampling error (Zikmund, 2003). Nevertheless, 
sampling error may be minimized by choosing a sample that is deemed 
representative of the population in question.  
Despite the fact that all the 3 162 records were inputted into the SPSS statistical 
package, only 785 of the company records contained all the relevant data elements 
required for the purposes of this research study and thus, by default, this became the 
sample size. This accidental type of sampling method has been adopted in prior 
studies conducted by Caneghem (2009), Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) and Hay et al 
(2006). This type of sampling method is termed convenience or accidental sampling 
(Zikmund, 2003). The major diasadvantage of this sampling method is that it is a 
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nonprobability type of sampling and, thus, it is not possible to generalise the results 
obtained to the population in question.    
3.5 Sources of data 
In view of the fact that financial information on unlisted companies is not easily 
obtainable, the research was limited to listed companies whose data is available on 
public electronic databases such as OSIRIS. The OSIRIS financial database 
provides secondary data in the form of audited financial statements for all the JSE-
listed companies in South Africa and is accessible to all the students of the 
University of the Witwatersrand. The data selected for this research study was 
therefore downloaded from the OSIRIS financial database and exported into 
Microsoft Excel.  
The advantages of using secondary data include the ease of collection, it is less 
expensive to gather compared to primary data and the fact that the researcher is 
saved from “reinventing the wheel” as is often the case with primary data collection 
(Zikmund, 2003). The disadvantages include the fact that the data may have been 
collected for purposes other than for the purpose of the research in question 
(Zikmund, 2003). Notwithstanding the disadvantages, the data collected was 
deemed relevant for this study because historical information is static and it was 
available for the period of study.  
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3.6 Collection of data 
The data was exported from the OSIRIS financial database directly into Microsoft 
Excel. A sample of the collection instrument containing the search criteria is shown 
in Appendix 2. The search criteria resulted in a total of 3 162 companies’ records 
being downloaded for the fiscal periods commencing 1 January 2007 and ending 31 
October 2012. The data was downloaded into six separate Excel worksheets in one 
workbook with each worksheet containing the data for one fiscal year. The method of 
exporting directly into Excel saved a lot of valuable time that would have been spent 
in transcribing the data. The major advantage of the method of direct export into 
Excel was that it eliminated the possibility of making transcription errors. 
3.7 Data management 
All the data conversion into a format suitable for uploading into the SPSS statistical 
package was carried out in Excel using advanced Excel formulae and manipulation 
procedures. This included rounding off financial figures to the nearest R1000, sorting 
the data into the respective fiscal years, computing the square roots of the number of 
subsidiaries and calculating the natural logarithms (to the base of 10) of certain 
variables. All the data conversion was carried out in a separate worksheet in order to 
preserve the original data as was downloaded from OSIRIS.  
Using the Data-Sort functionality in Excel, the data was sorted firstly into company 
name order (i.e.: alphabetical order) and then into the “Closing date” order. Two 
extra columns were inserted next to the “Auditor Name” and “Closing date” variables. 
In the one column titled BIG4, a dummy variable of 1 was placed against the name 
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of the auditor firm if it belonged to the BIG4 and 0 if it did not. In the second column, 
titled Year, the fiscal year in which the final closing date fell was inserted, for 
example, a closing date of 31 March 2008, the Year applicable variable was 2008.  
The details of the data conversion included the following: the variable Audit Fees 
(sub) th LCU in the original file was converted into a natural logarithm value to the 
base of 10 using the Excel formula Log10 (number) represented by Ln(AUDFEE) in 
the model. The same log operation was performed on Auditors Consulting Fees 
(sub) th LCU and Total Assets th LCU thus creating new variables which were 
termed Ln(NASFEE) and Ln(TA) respectively. The column INVREC contained a ratio 
which had been created by dividing the sum of the variables Stock th LCU and 
Debtors th LCU by Total Assets th LCU. Column SQRTSUB contained the square 
root of the No. of Rec. Subsidiaries variable while in ROA, EBIT th LCU was divided 
by Total Assets th LCU. In TD/TA, Total Liabilities & Debt th LCU was divided by 
Total Assets th LCU while in CA/CL, Total Current Assets th LCU was divided by 
Total Liabilities th LCU. Other non-computational columns were copied across as 
follows: Company Name, Auditor Firm, Closing Date, Currency, 
Listed/unlisted/delisted and Industry Sector. In addition, the following two columns 
were added: the BIG4 variable of 1 if the audit firm was a member of the BIG4 or 0 if 
otherwise and the Year variable being the fiscal year containing the Closing Date.  
3.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis consists of summarising, rearranging, ordering or manipulating data in 
order to render the data easy to understand and interpret (Zikmund, 2003). The 
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SPSS statistical package was used to analyse the data with the package producing 
both descriptive and inferential statistics. Both types of statistics describe the 
properties of a population. Descriptive statistics provide a description or summary of 
the information pertaining to the population while on the other hand, inferential 
statistics, are used to make inferences or deductions about a population based on 
sample observations (Wegner, 2001; Zikmund, 2003).  
The data was presented in the following formats: tabulations indicating measures of 
central tendency and dispersion such as means, medians, standard deviations and 
ranges; graphs in the form of histograms, normal P-P plots and scatter plots; 
percentage distributions analysing market shares and other tabulations containing 
information on ANOVA results, factor analysis, and regression models. Measures of 
dispersion such as the standard deviation and range provide useful information on 
the location of the mean with widely dispersed observations indicating low reliability 
(Wegner, 2001). Graphs were used to provide a visual representation of the 
compliance of the data with both MRA and ANOVA assumptions namely the 
independence of errors, homoscedasticity and normality. 
After the data conversion, the raw data was fed into SPSS statistical package, which 
uses the ordinary least squares method, to analyse the data. The output from SPSS 
included both descriptive and inferential statistics.   
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3.9 Validity and reliability 
3.9.1 Validity 
Zikmund (2003) describes validity as “the ability of a measure … to measure what it 
is supposed to measure” while Bryman & Bell (2007) contend that validity is 
concerned with the integrity of the results of a research study. There are two types of 
validity namely external and internal (Creswell, 2009). External validity or population 
validity is concerned with the generalisability of the results of a study to the 
population to which the research hypothesis applies (Welman & Kruger 2001; 
Creswell 2009). In view of the fact that the sample used in this study was selected by 
default, using a non-probability sampling method, the results will not be 
generalizable to the population of listed companies.    
On the other hand, the internal validity of a conclusion refers the extent to which it 
accurately attributes the changes in the dependent variable to the independent 
variable and not to any other factors (Welman & Kruger, 2001). For the purposes of 
this study, various regression diagnostics such as tests for normality, 
heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity were carried out to enhance the validity of the 
regression models.    
3.9.2 Face or content validity 
Zikmund (2003) defines face or content validity as the the subjective agreement 
among experts, in an area of knowledge, that a scale logically measures what it 
purports to measure while providing adequate coverage of the concept. In regression 
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modelling, the model fitness is measured by R2, which is termed the coefficient of 
determination (Zikmund, 2003). R2 explains the proportion of variation in the 
dependent variable which is explained by the independent variables with values 
close to 1 implying that most of the variability in the dependent variable is explained 
by the regression model (Montgomery et al., 2006). R2 is also known as the 
correlation ratio. The interpretation of whether a ratio is either high or not is relative 
depending on the context of the research and, thus, it is a subjective evaluation 
based on theory and prior research within a particular area of study  (Gamst et al, 
2008).   
Prior research studies on audit fees have yielded a range of results for R2. Ebrahim 
(2010) recorded model fitness for the years covered by his study ranging from 0.73 
to 0.81; Hay et al. (2006), accepted adjusted R2 ranging from 0.77 to 0.79; Ireland 
and Lennox (2002), recorded R2 ranging from 0.82 to 0.86 while Cameran (2005) 
recorded an R2 of 0.74 and an adjusted R2 of 0.73.  
3.9.3 Construct validity 
Construct validity refers the degree to which the results of a research study conform 
to a network of related hypotheses which are generated from the relevant theory on 
the concepts on which the study in question focuses. Construct validity is established 
during statistical analysis (Zikmund, 2003). According to Zikmund (2003), if the 
measure behaves in an expected manner and displays a pattern of inter-correlation 
with other variables, then this confirms the existence of construct. In this research 
study, two hypotheses were formulated and were tested using regression models run 
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in SPSS. The ANOVA test was also used to test the hypotheses. The results are 
discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
3.9.4 Reliability 
In quantitative research, the issue of reliability is concerned with whether the 
research study can be replicated over time using the same group of respondents 
(Zikmund, 2003). The replicability of this research study was assured in that the 
secondary data used was static and is available on the OSIRIS database for future 
research. Also reliability is derived on the integrity of all listed companies to comply 
with the IFRS framework, the requirements of the Companies Act, the corporate 
governance principles contained in King-III and the specific requirements of the JSE. 
Lastly, the regression models were run using only companies with relevant and 
complete data. 
 
3.10 Assumptions, limitations and delimitations 
In view of the fact that a nonprobability sample was used in the research study, the 
research results are not generalisable to all listed companies on the JSE. The scope 
of the research was also limited to the impact of one of the changes in King-III 
namely the introduction of an Integrated Report and, thus, the results of the research 
may not be interpreted as to cover the entire spectrum of the changes indicated in 
King-III as compared to King-II. In addition, the research sample assumed that data 
completeness meant that a company would have incurred both audit and non-audit 
service fees. In real life, this is not always true as some of the consultancy services 
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that auditors usually offer may be “in-sourced” to the internal audit department in 
other companies. The research also assumed that the statutory auditor was also the 
provider of non-audit service fees. Since the concept of integrated reporting is still in 
its infancy stages, coupled with the fact that compliance is voluntary, the research 
results may be affected by the rate of uptake of the new concept by the listed 
companies. Lastly and quite importantly, the results have to be interpreted with the 
full knowledge that MRA does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship between 
audit fees and non-audit service fees.    
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CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the regression models. The 
descriptive statistics in respect of the variables used in the models will be presented 
first. These will be followed by a discussion of the regression diagnostics which were 
carried out to ensure that the underlying assumptions of multiple regression analysis 
(MRA) were not violated in order not to invalidate the research results. The empirical 
results of the pooled regression and the cross-sectional models then follow and are 
discussed in relation to the research questions and accompanying hypotheses. For 
reasons of confidentiality, the BIG4 audit firms in South Africa will be referred to in 
the report as Firm 1, Firm 2, Firm 3 and Firm 4.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics pertaining to the raw data before any 
transformation was undertaken on some of the variables.  
Descriptive statistics are used to summarise information about a population 
(Zikmund, 2003) by conveying more precise information about the behaviour of the 
random variables through measures of central location (the mean and the median) 
and also measures of dispersion (the standard deviation and the range) (Wegner, 
2001). The measures reduce huge volumes of data into a simple format to enable 
the understanding of a population sample.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLES Year Mean Median
 Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N
AUDFEE (R 000) 2007 5,197         1,200        10,328          2                   86,000           140
2008 5,452         1,341        10,758          3                   75,000           246
2009 9,409         1,844        50,441          8                   794,000         260
2010 6,492         1,927        14,696          123               160,000         255
2011 8,222         1,802        32,227          50                 471,654         244
2012 10,682       1,826        46,173          94                 444,906         98
NASFEE  (R 000) 2007 2,604         555           8,842            3                   76,000           93
2008 2,466         355           11,706          1                   149,000         169
2009 4,718         595           26,404          1                   309,900         180
2010 4,152         574           24,494          2                   322,000         179
2011 4,629         578           24,662          1                   303,000         161
2012 7,561         382           41,916          4                   315,000         57
TA       (R 000) 2007 7,582,554  945,367    17,557,296   8,390            119,065,000  140
2008 7,899,322  812,614    19,108,669   13,058          170,106,000  246
2009 7,769,205  862,834    18,390,186   12,586          156,237,000  260
2010 7,715,801  984,600    18,572,968   3,006            155,873,000  255
2011 8,443,589  1,116,032 21,390,618   1,683            181,408,000  244
2012 8,254,445  1,120,868 23,811,649   100               203,753,000  98
INVENTORY (R 000) 2007 849,021     81,118      1,830,246     77                 14,399,000    118
2008 873,547     86,033      2,084,315     -               20,088,000    203
2009 800,583     92,423      1,758,544     18                 14,589,000    210
2010 827,991     106,659    1,927,389     -               16,472,000    207
2011 915,716     113,459    2,266,116     -               18,512,000    196
2012 974,656     105,420    2,708,175     74                 20,668,000    73
ACCOUNTS 2007 788,570     112,442    1,866,210     101               14,733,000    135
RECEIVABLES 2008 785,344     91,309      1,961,177     -               18,720,000    240
(R 000) 2009 707,561     100,571    1,547,381     -               11,794,000    250
2010 741,566     101,615    1,714,864     -               17,074,000    247
2011 813,836     101,076    2,066,040     -               20,398,000    232
2012 1,045,047  112,483    2,734,081     -               21,157,000    92
NO.OF 2007 20              34                 -               355                140
SUBSIDIARIES 2008 19              29                 -               355                246
2009 19              28                 -               355                260
2010 18              27                 -               355                255
2011 18              28                 -               355                244
2012 16              16                 -               79                  98
EBIT 2007 1,162,255  3,730,245     -3,337,000   26,120,000    138
2008 1,084,215  3,912,632     -16,709,000 33,770,000    245
2009 816,533     2,897,845     -1,815,000   31,720,000    260
2010 1,049,315  4,316,873     -3,460,200   45,495,000    253
2011 1,038,849  4,123,807     -1,519,860   39,283,000    243
2012 1,102,795  4,207,064     -514,871      36,994,000    95
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The mean audit fees increased by 105.56% from R5,197,000 in 2007 to 
R10,682,000 in 2012. The year-on-year mean growth was 5% in 2008 as compared 
to 2007, 73% in 2009, a drop of 31% in 2010 and then growing again by 27% and 
30% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The growth in non-audit service fees mirrored a 
similar pattern of growth of 5% in 2008 (same as audit fees), registering the highest 
rate of 91% in 2009, experiencing negative growth in 2010 and then growing by 11% 
and 63% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. It would appear that the negative growth in 
2010 was in tandem with the negative decline of minus 1.5% recorded by the 
economy of South Africa in the same year (African Economic Outlook, 2013).  
While both audit fees and non-audit service fees registered huge increases of 73% 
and 191% respectively in 2009, the rest of the variables experienced a decline in the 
growth of their mean values as follows: Total Assets, -2%; Inventory, -8%; Accounts 
Receivables, -10%; and EBIT, -25%. The majority of studies confirm a high 
correlation between audit fees and the size of the client as measured by Total 
Assets. In contrast, the growth of the mean of Total Assets did not conform to this 
correlation as growth was significantly more erratic and also smaller as compared to 
audit fees as follows: 4% in 2008; -2% in 2009; -1% in 2010; 9% in 2011 and another 
decline of -2% in 2012. Over the period of the study, the maximum audit fees 
charged by the auditors increase by 417% from R86 million in 2007 to R444.9 million 
in 2012, while Total Assets grew by only 71% from R119 million in 2007 to R203 
million in 2012.  
The average number of subsidiaries over the period was between 18 and 19 with the 
maximum number of subsidiaries between 2007 and 2011 being 355. In 2012 this 
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maximum declined to 79 and this could be as a result of the fact that less data was 
available for 2012 as it was not a full fiscal year at the date of downloading the data. 
The growth in EBIT was 42% over the period of study and this clearly lagged behind 
the growth in both audit and non-audit service fees.   
Table 4.2: King-III regression data: distribution by audit firm type 
YEAR BIG4 % of TOTAL Non-BIG4 % of TOTAL TOTAL
2007 65 70% 28 30% 93
2008 121 73% 45 27% 166
2009 127 74% 45 26% 172
2010 121 74% 42 26% 163
2011 106 74% 37 26% 143
2012 35 73% 13 27% 48
TOTAL 575 73% 210 27% 785
 
Table 4.2 analyses the 785 companies’ data which were used in the regression 
models, classified according to the type of audit firm (BIG4 or Non-BIG4) that the 
companies in question engaged. In 2007, 65 companies were audited by the BIG4, 
constituting 70% of the 93 companies’ data in that year. In all the subsequent years, 
the proportion improved to above 70%. The total market share of the BIG4 for the 
period comprised 575 companies or 73% of the market.   
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Table 4.3: Analysis of companies before and after King-III 
Period 
Number of 
companies 
% 
Pre-King-III  453 58% 
Post King-III 332 42% 
TOTAL 785 100% 
Table 4.3 shows that there were 453 and 332 companies’ data in the regression 
model pre and post King-III respectively. The disparity was mainly as a result of the 
fact that there was more fiscal years pre-King-III in the period covered by the study. 
Nevertheless, the difference is not that significant despite the post King-III period 
being considerably shorter than the pre-King-III period. It would appear that this 
information confirms that companies have become more aware of the importance of 
complying with corporate governance principles. 
Table 4.4: BIG4 market share analysis 
2007 23 35% 6 9% 20 31% 16 25% 65 100%
2008 38 31% 13 11% 32 27% 38 31% 121 100%
2009 43 34% 11 9% 35 27% 38 30% 127 100%
2010 42 35% 12 9% 31 26% 36 30% 121 100%
2011 33 31% 12 11% 25 24% 36 34% 106 100%
2012 12 34% 2 6% 11 31% 10 29% 35 100%
Total 191 33% 56 10% 154 27% 174 30% 575 100%
Firm 2 Firm 3Firm 1 Firm 4 Total
 
Table 4.4 analyses the market share occupied by each of the BIG4 audit firms during 
the period 2007 to 2012. During this period, Firm 1 was the most dominant as it 
occupied the top position in 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012 with market shares of 35, 
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34, 35 and 34% respectively. Firm 4 was the second highest during the period 
although it was the highest in 2011 with 34% of the market share, and shared the 
highest position with Firm 1 in 2008, with both firms achieving 31% respectively. The 
average market shares for the period shows the ranking, in order of market share, as 
follows: Firm 1 (33%), Firm 4 (30%), Firm 3 (27%) and Firm 2 (10%).  
4.3 Regression diagnostics 
Regression diagnostic are tests which are performed on data to ensure that the 
results of regression models are not invalidated as a result of violating the key 
assumptions of MRA. According to Sheather (2009), multiple regression analysis has 
the following four underlying assumptions: (1) there must be a linear relationshp 
between the dependent variable/s (Y1…n) and the independent variable/s (X1…n); (2); 
(2) the errors must be independent of each other; (3) the errors must have a 
common variance (homoscedaciticity); and (4) the errors must be normally 
distributed with a mean of zero (0).     
Assumption one and three on linearity and the common variance of errors were 
tested using scatter plots (See Appendices 1a to 1g). The scatter plots for all the 
cross-sectional models from 2007 to 2012 as well as the pooled model showed no 
discernible pattern in the plotted values. This demonstrates that the data did not 
violate the assumptions of MRA as regards linearity and the variance of errors. Any 
discernible patterns would have indicated an uneven distribution of the residuals 
about the regression line. 
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The second assumption that the errors must be independent of each other was 
tested by computing the both the Durbin-Watson and the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) statistics for each model. Both statistics were computed as part of the SPSS 
package output and are summarised in tables 4.5 and 4.6 below. All the cross-
sectional regression models were characterised by Durbin-Watson statistics in the 
range >1 and <3, thus, suggesting that there was no correlation among the 
variables. Values of the Durbin-Watson statistic range from 0 to 4 and as a general 
rule, the residuals are uncorrelated if the value of the statistic is approximately 2, 
with a value close to 0 indicating a strong negative correlation while a value of 4 
indicates a strong positive correlation. The independence of errors was also 
confirmed by the VIFs as depicted in table 4.6. 
Table 4.5: Durbin-Watson statistics  
Year
 Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
2007 2.040                  
2008 1.756                  
2009 2.049                  
2010 1.858                  
2011 1.786                  
2012 1.776                  
Pooled 1.318                  
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Table 4.6: Variance Inflation Factors 
VARIABLE 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
POOLED 
MODEL
Ln (NASFEE) 2.161 2.15 1.833 1.687 1.977 3.117 1.888
INVREC 1.162 1.094 1.181 1.14 1.237 1.388 1.114
Ln (TA) 2.538 2.498 2.481 2.22 2.715 4.342 2.497
ROA 1.083 1.081 1.142 1.18 1.278 1.309 1.093
SQRTSUB 1.58 1.556 1.556 1.475 1.536 1.967 1.536
TD/TA 1.609 1.346 1.512 1.457 1.181 2.142 1.101
CA/CL 1.714 1.305 1.454 1.514 1.209 1.805 1.036
Firm 1 1.695 1.854 1.744 1.722 1.726 2.062 1.727
Firm 2 1.339 1.308 1.303 1.338 1.374 1.291 1.294
Firm 3 1.386 1.475 1.477 1.573 1.473 1.785 1.453
Firm 4 1.569 1.66 1.643 1.668 1.729 1.921 1.634
King3 1.095
 
A VIF is a measure of how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient 
increases if the independent variables are correlated. VIFs are used to check for the 
existence of multicollinearity in regression variables. Multicollinearity arises in 
regression analysis when strong correlations exist among the independent variables. 
This results in incorrect regression coefficient signs as well as to statistically 
insignificant independent variables. The highest VIF of 4.342 was recorded against 
the variable Ln (TA) in 2012 while the lowest VIF of 1.036 was recorded against the 
variable CA/CL in the pooled model. 
As depicted in table 4.6, all the VIFs were well below a value of 5, which, according 
to Sheather (2009), is the acceptable cut-off point.  Hay et al (2006) accepted VIFs 
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below a value of 10 and it would appear that this is also the acceptable norm in 
practice. It may therefore be safely concluded that multicollinearity was not a 
problem in all the regression models which were run in this research study, 
otherwise the models would have been poorly estimated.   
The fourth and final assumption of MRA being that the errors must be normally 
distributed with a mean of zero (0) was tested by observing the histograms and 
normal probability plots of the residuals (See Appendices 1a to 1g). A visual 
inspection of the histograms showed that the data for all the years followed a normal 
distribution while the normal probability plots showed that all data points were almost 
in a straight line. It was therefore evident that both the histograns and normal 
probability plots confirmed the normality of the data.       
4.4 OLS regression results 
4.4.1 Pooled regression model 
A pooled regression model was run with the log of audit fees as the dependent 
variable. The results of the model are presented in table 4.7.  
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Table 4.7:  
Panel A: Pooled regression model results 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B
Std. 
Error
Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 0,943 0,141 6,695 0,000
Ln (NASFEE) 0,138 0,015 0,205* 9,400 0,000 0,530 1,888
INVREC 0,111 0,053 0,035* 2,109 0,035 0,898 1,114
Ln (TA) 0,474 0,019 0,630* 25,154 0,000 0,401 2,497
ROA -0,183 0,062 -0,049* -2,967 0,003 0,915 1,093
SQRTSUB 0,037 0,005 0,147* 7,497 0,000 0,651 1,536
TD/TA 0,172 0,056 0,051* 3,071 0,002 0,908 1,101
CA/CL 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,221 0,825 0,965 1,036
Firm 1 0,055 0,029 0,039 1,891 0,059 0,579 1,727
Firm 2 0,252 0,042 0,107* 5,946 0,000 0,773 1,294
Firm 3 0,091 0,029 0,06 3,141 0,002 0,688 1,453
Firm 4 0,035 0,029 0,024 1,172 0,242 0,612 1,634
King3 0,052 0,032 0,027 1,619 0,106 0,913 1,095
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
 
* Significant at p-value <0.05 
 
 
 
Panel B: Pooled model summary 
 
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Durbin-
Watson
1 0,898 0,806 0,803 0,2682047 1,318
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Panel C: Pooled model ANOVA results 
Sum of 
Squares
df
Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Regression 230,636 12 19,22 267,186 0,000
Residual 55,533 772 0,072
Total 286,169 784
Model
1
 
The pooled regression sought to answer research question 1 as to whether Post 
King-III, auditors in South Africa were charging an audit fee premium in response to 
the recommendations of the code on integrated reporting. The model showed a good 
fit with an R2 of 80.6% and adjusted R2 of 80.3%. The high coefficient of 
determinations means that the model was well specified and accounted for 80.3% of 
the change in the dependent variable. This compares favourably with prior studies 
which were conducted by Jaggi and Low (2009). Their three models showed 
adjusted R2 of 66.75%, 66.88% and 66.26% respectively, while the OLS regressions 
of Hay et al (2006) achieved adjusted R2 of 77.6%, 77.4% and 79.2% respectively.  
The ANOVA test in Panel C shows a significant F-statistic of 267.186 (p<0.05) thus 
indicating that the null hypothesis was not true. The alternate hypothesis was 
therefore accepted. Thus the implication is that post King-III, the BIG4 audit firms 
were charging an audit fee premium as compared to the non-BIG4 firms. This was 
clearly evidenced by the statistically significant coefficients for both Firms 2 and 3 as 
was measured by the t-statistics of 5.946 and 3.141 (both at p<0.05) respectively. 
Firms 1 and 4 both had positive coefficients, thus implying that they were charging 
higher fees as compared to the non-BIG4 although the premium was not statistically 
significant.   
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The King3 variable, which indicated whether a company’s data had been audited 
either before or after the introduction of King-III, also showed a positive effect on 
audit fees although it was not statistically significant with a t-statistic of 1.619 
(p>0.05). This indicated that the King3 variable contributed positively to the audit 
fees charged by auditors post the introduction of King-III.  
All the other independent variables displayed statistical significance with audit fees 
except for CA/CL (current ratio). This contradicts the findings of other research 
studies conducted by Whisenant et al (2003) and Hoitash et al (2007) who found the 
current ratio to be statistically significant with audit fees. But, the findings of this 
current study are consistent with the results of Hay et al (2006) who did not find any 
statistical significance between audit fees and the current ratio. Nevertheless, the 
mixed results on the variable may indicate a lack of consensus as to whether the 
variable measures either liquidity or risk. Caneghem (2009) included the ratio in his 
study as a proxy for short-term liquidity while Blankley et al (2012) included it as a 
control for audit risk. The coefficients of the rest of the variables are explained in the 
next paragraphs.   
Consistent with studies conducted by Ebrahim (2010) and Hoitash et al (2007), this 
study found that profitability, as measured by ROA, was negatively correlated with 
audit fees with a significant coefficient of -0.049 (p<0.05). This appears to resonate 
with reality in that profitable companies tend to be perceived as less risky compared 
to non-profitable companies and hence, they attract lower audit fees. The contrary is 
true of less profitable companies which tend to attract higher audit fees as their 
perceived risk is also higher, even though this contradicts with the results found by 
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Simunic (1980), who found the PROFIT variable to be insignificantly correlated to 
audit fees.              
Total Assets, represented by Ln (TA), with a t-statistic of 25.154 (p<0.05), were 
found to be statistically significantly correlated with audit fees. This is confirmed by a 
majority of studies which found a statistically significant relationship between size of 
the auditee as measured by Total Assets and audit fees (Jaggi & Low, 2011; Hay et 
al 2006; Hoitash et al, 2007; Charles et al, 2010; Caneghem, 2009). According to 
Charles et al (2010), size accounts for close to 70% of the cross sectional variation 
in audit fees as large firms require more audit effort, as they have more transactions, 
larger balances and higher agency costs, as well as attracting more public scrutiny. 
Accordingly, they present a higher risk to the auditor (Naser & Nuseibeth, 2007).  
Prior studies (Bell et al, 2001; De Berg et al, 1991; Palmrose, 1986; Simunic, 1984) 
also recorded a significant positive association between audit fees and non-audit 
service fees. This finding was confirmed in this research study with the significant    
t-static of 9.400 (p<0.05). Thus, this confirms the finding of prior studies which 
posited that the positive association between audit fees and non-audit service fees 
was a result of the existence of knowledge spill-overs between the two services as 
well as the increasingly blurred identities of the two services resulting from, among 
other reasons, the arbitrary allocation of fees in the books of the auditee as well as 
incentives for audit partners to misclassify non-audit fees by grouping them together 
with audit fees (Hay et al, 2006).  
All the four auditor firm variables displayed positive coefficients thus attesting to the 
existence of an audit fee premium in the model. Firms 2 and 3 displayed statistically 
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significant relationship with audit fees as measured by the t-statistics of 5.946 and 
3.141 (p<0.05) respectively. This may, in turn, be as a result of the BIG4 auditors 
being the natural choice of large clients (Carson, 2009), who require the services of 
the BIG firms to meet their needs.  Maybe, as a result, in such cases, the BIG4 audit 
firms tend to justify their higher fees on the premise that they are able to provide 
higher audit quality, better auditor independence as well as advanced and varied 
audit techniques as compared to the smaller audit firms (Chaney et al, 2004; 
DeAngelo, 1981; Ireland & Lennox, 2002).   
Both INVREC and SQRTSUB displayed positive significant relationships with audit 
fees with t-statistics of 2.109 and 7.497 (p<0.05) respectively. The existence of a 
number of subsidiaries leads to greater diversification and decentralisation of the 
financial reporting entity points (Simunic, 1980) as well as increasing the volume of 
work and complexity associated with consolidated accounts (Ireland & Lennox, 
2002). On the other hand, huge stocks of inventories often mean that the audit is 
complex as a result of both the nature of the transactions and the complicated 
standards on recognition and measurement, as well as the use of professional 
judgement to assess probable future outcomes (Blankley et al, 2012).  
Finally, the variable TD/TA displayed a significant relationship with audit fees with a 
t-statistic of 3.071 (p<0.05). According to Simunic (1980), measures of leverage 
represent the risk of an auditee failing and this, inevitably, potentially exposes the 
auditor to loss.  
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4.4.2 Cross-sectional regression model results    
The results of the cross-sectional regressions from 2007 to 2012 are shown in table 
4.8: Panel A and B.  
Table 4.8:   
Panel A: Cross-sectional models: coefficients and p-values 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.005    0.014    0.004    0.000 0.000 0.130    
Ln (NASFEE) 0.458* 0.000 0.080     0.066    0.257* 0.000 0.183* 0.000 0.185* 0.000 0.087     0.431    
INVREC -0.052   0.388    0.058     0.063    0.074* 0.047    0.002     0.956    0.037     0.343    0.131     0.080    
Ln (TA) 0.362* 0.000 0.757* 0.000 0.608* 0.000 0.629     0.000 0.648     0.000 0.785* 0.000
ROA 0.012     0.832    -0.070* 0.024    -0.039   0.277    -0.012 0.742    -0.023   0.561    -0.035   0.625    
SQRTSUB 0.130     0.064    0.116     0.002    0.125* 0.003    0.181* 0.000 0.188     0.000 0.051     0.562    
TD/TA 0.022     0.752    0.042     0.225    -0.024   0.564    0.078     0.064    0.071     0.062    -0.159   0.086    
CA/CL -0.079   0.275    -0.044   0.195    -0.087* 0.034    -0.056   0.189    0.010     0.801    -0.244* 0.006    
Firm 1 0.003     0.965    0.083* 0.039    0.051     0.257    0.042     0.355    0.051     0.260    0.015     0.870    
Firm 2 0.086     0.181    0.123* 0.000 0.150* 0.000 0.083* 0.039    0.075     0.067    0.048     0.495    
Firm 3 0.161* 0.015    0.106* 0.003    0.053     0.202    0.001     0.973    0.058     0.172    0.032     0.702    
Firm 4 -0.039   0.573    0.000 0.998    0.062     0.157    0.011     0.812    0.027     0.550    0.100     0.247    
R2
Adjusted R2
F-Statistic 22.425* 0.000 90.749* 0.000 65.014* 0.000 62.423* 0.000 64.190* 0.000 20.666* 0.000
No. of observations 93                              
0.857                        
166                           
0.753                        
2007 2008
0.719                        
143                           48                              163                           
0.863                        
172                           
0.866                        0.844                        
0.805                        
2012
0.822                        
2010
0.807                        
0.817                        
2011
0.830                        
0.820                        
2009
 
Note: * Significant at p <=0.05 (two-tailed test) 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional models: t-statistics  
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(Constant) 2,853 2,478 2,955 4,119 4,061 1,548
Ln (NASFEE) 5,644 1,853 5,624 4,085 3,805 0,796
INVREC -0,868 1,87 2,002 0,055 0,952 1,800
Ln (TA) 4,113 16,262 11,425 12,214 11,383 6,110
ROA 0,213 -2,282 -1,09 -0,329 -0,583 -0,493
SQRTSUB 1,878 3,144 2,965 4,323 4,387 0,585
TD/TA 0,318 1,219 -0,578 1,869 1,884 -1,768
CA/CL -1,099 -1,302 -2,142 -1,318 0,253 -2,941
Firm 1 0,043 2,081 1,139 0,927 1,132 0,165
Firm 2 1,35 3,654 3,88 2,084 1,845 0,689
Firm 3 2,478 2,971 1,28 0,034 1,373 0,385
Firm 4 -0,566 -0,002 1,424 0,239 0,600 1,176
 
Cross sectional regressions were run for each of the years 2007 to 2012 in order to 
track if any of the BIG4 audit firms had been charging a fee premium prior to the 
introduction of King-III. The cross sectional regressions also presented a degree of 
triangulation of the pooled regression model results.  
As shown in table 4.8: Panel A, all the models were well specified as shown by the 
high Adjusted R2. The Adjusted R2 ranged from the lowest specification of 71.9% in 
2007 to the highest of 85.7% in 2008. The other years were as follows: 2009, 80.5%; 
2010, 80.7%; 2011, 83% and 2012, 82.2%. The F-statistics for all the models were 
significant at p<0.05.  
The following variables recorded interesting associations with audit fees. The 
NASFEE variable was positive throughout the years but was significant only in 2007, 
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2009, 2010 and 2011. The variable Ln (TA) was consistent with the pooled model as 
it was positive and significant throughout the years proving that client size was in fact 
the most dominant determinant of audit fees (Caneghem, 2009).  
ROA had a positive coefficient only in 2007, though not significant, with the rest of 
the years recording insignificant negative association with audit fees except in 2008, 
when the association was significant. Consistent with the result in the pooled model, 
ROA was negatively associated with audit fees in all the years except in 2007. The 
result largely confirms the finding of a negative association between audit fees and 
ROA. Caneghem (2009) confirms this finding by stating that audit fees ought to be 
higher for clients with poorer performance as compared to the audit fees charged to 
better performing clients, as the former pose a higher risk to the auditor.   
The coefficients of all the BIG4 variables were positive throughout the years, again 
confirming the charging of an audit fee premium by the big four firms, although they 
were intermittently significant throughout the period. Of interest, Firm 4 did not record 
any significant association in any of the years. Firm 1 was significant only in 2008 
while Firm 2 was significant for three consecutive years namely 2008, 2009 and 
2010. Firm 3 was significant in the two consecutive years of 2007 and 2008. In the 
pooled model, Firms 2 and 3 were the only BIG4 firms with positively significant 
coefficients, and they were also the only two firms which were significant for at least 
two consecutive years in the cross sectional models.   
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4.4.3 Factor Analysis 
Table 4.9: Rotated component matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ln (AUDFEE) 0.899 -0.031 0.041 0.030 0.142 0.168 -0.044
Ln (TA) 0.875 -0.125 0.110 0.123 0.176 0.118 -0.078
SQRTSUB 0.780 0.093 -0.151 -0.019 -0.158 -0.086 0.007
Ln (NASFEE) 0.756 -0.078 0.088 0.021 0.094 0.288 0.051
INVREC -0.213 0.870 0.114 0.169 -0.008 0.080 0.024
TD/TA 0.355 0.550 -0.249 -0.311 0.015 -0.219 -0.192
INDUSTRY SECTOR 0.059 0.031 0.973 0.021 -0.034 -0.016 -0.014
ROA 0.113 0.071 0.015 0.954 0.050 -0.004 -0.014
King3 0.121 0.001 -0.037 0.048 0.976 0.039 0.014
BIG FOUR FIRM 0.272 0.012 -0.020 0.003 0.040 0.918 -0.048
CA/CL -0.020 -0.036 -0.012 -0.006 0.014 -0.040 0.988
Component
 
A factor analysis was carried out to identify the underlying factors that influenced the 
results of the pooled model as well as to explore further whether there was any 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit service fees. The variables with 
loadings or correlations above 0.50 with each factor are highlighted in red ink for 
ease of reference. Using principal component analysis and varimax rotation, it was 
found that seven components explained 85.05% of the variation among the variables 
and hence may be used to identify the underlying components which are key in 
determining audit fees.  
The main purpose of the rotated component matrix was to show the degree of 
correlation between each variable and the underlying component. Consistent with 
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the findings of Hay et al (2006), component 1 was predominantly correlated with the 
variables measuring size and these were total assets, number of subsidiaries, audit 
fees and non-audit service fees. Component 2 appeared to be associated with the 
ability of a company to meet its long term liabilities as measured by inventories and 
receivables (INVREC) as well as the level of gearing (TD/TA). Component 3 was 
linked to the industry sector while component 4 was correlated with profitability. 
Component 5 was influenced by timeframe and that was whether the audit took 
place before or after the introduction of King-III. Component 6 was associated with 
the size of the audit firm while component 7 was correlated to short-term liquidity.  
The results of factor analysis, particularly in relation to component 1, show that (1) 
audit fees and non-audit service fees are correlated, and (2) both audit and non-audit 
service fees are correlated with measures of size as measured by the number of 
SQRTSUB and Ln (TA) in this research study. The results reject the null hypothesis 
by accepting the alternate hypothesis which states that post King-III, there was a 
significant relation between audit and non-audit service fees. According to Hay et al 
(2006), their research study results showed that audit and non-audit service fees 
were in fact jointly determined with the determining factor being the size of the client.   
4.4.4 Relation between audit and non-audit service fees 
Table 4.10: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Pearson Correlation Coefficient 0.758 0.693 0.720 0.638 0.682 0.719
Significance (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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The Pearson Correlation Coefficient between Ln (AUDFEE) and Ln (NASFEE) as 
summarised in table 4.10, showed that in the cross-sectional models run, the 
relationship between the two variables was highly significant throughout the years at 
p<0.05. The lowest coefficient was 0.638 in 2010 while the highest was 0.758 in 
2007. The results corroborate the results of the factor analysis as well as the 
significant positive correlation recorded in the pooled model.  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the descriptive statistics pertinent to the 
study. Tables summarising the distribution of clients between the BIG4 and non-
BIG4 firms, analysing the number of companies before and after the introduction of 
King-III as well as the BIG4 market share completed the section on descriptive 
statistics. The empirical section presented the results of the regression diagnostics 
which were carried out to ensure that the regression results were not invalidated as a 
result of violation of the MRA assumptions. The chapter then concluded by 
presenting and analysing the results of both the pooled and cross-sectional models, 
including the results of the ANOVA tests, the results of the factor analysis and the 
Person Correlation Coefficients between audit and non-audit service fees.   
The next chapter concludes the research report by drawing conclusions on the 
research findings and, based on those conclusions, makes recommendations on 
areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 5 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary 
The purpose of the empirical study was to evaluate the impact of integrated 
reporting, as recommended in King-III, on the level of both audit and non-audit 
service fees charged by the BIG4 audit firms to companies listed on the JSE. The 
study adopted a quantitative approach. Using the multiple regression analysis 
technique, the relationship between audit fees, as the dependent variable, and 
selected independent variables was evaluated. The fee model was adapted from a 
study conducted by Hay et at (2006), which, like all other audit fee models in prior 
studies, was a derivation from the seminal study of Simunic (1980). 
In order to explore the research phenomena, two research questions were 
formulated. The first question sought to ascertain whether, post King-III, the BIG4 
audit firms in South Africa were charging an audit fee premium in response to the 
recommendations of the code (King-III) on integrated reporting. The second research 
question sought to determine whether there was a correlation between audit fees 
and non-audit service fees as it has been empirically proven that the spill-over 
effects between the two services tend to make the allocation of the fees an arbitrary 
allocation exercise (Hay et al, 2006).  
A review of the relevant literature on the research topic was carried out in chapter 2 
in order to provide a theoretical underpinning to the research study. A brief overview 
of the seminal study conducted by Simunic (1980) led to a discussion of the 
regression model for this study and its variables. The regulation of auditors by both 
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the IRBA and the provisions of the Companies Act as well as the principles 
recommended in King-III were explored. It appeared from the literature review that 
there are no prior studies undertaken to date, post King-III, in South Africa that have 
attempted to determine the impact of integrated reporting on the level of both the 
audit fees and non-audit service fees being charged by the BIG audit firms.  
The research methodology used in the study was discussed in chapter 3. The 
discussion focused on the population of the study, how the data was collected and 
analysed, including the regression diagnostics which were carried out to ensure that 
the results were valid and reliable.  
Chapter 4 presented the findings of the research study. The research results 
confirmed that post King-III, auditors were charging an audit fee premium with two of 
the firms displaying statistically significant coefficients at p<0.05, while, although the 
other two firms displayed positive coefficients, these were not statistically significant. 
Thus, these findings attested to the existence of a BIG4 audit fee premium after the 
introduction of integrated reporting in King-III. The research findings also proved the 
existence of a strong correlation between audit fees and non-audit service fees.   
5.2 Conclusion 
The regression diagnostics confirmed that the assumptions of both multiple 
regression analysis and ANOVA were not violated for all the years of the study and, 
thus, in that respect, all the models were valid and well specified (all adjusted R2 
were above 70%). The models are therefore worthy of being considered for 
predictive purposes of audit fees as their explanatory threshold is quite high.  
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In order to address the first research question as to whether post King-III, auditors in 
South Africa were charging an audit fee premium in response to recommendations of 
the code (King-III) on integrated reporting, both a pooled regression and an ANOVA 
test were carried out. The ANOVA test was significant at p<=0.05 and thus, the null 
hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis, which stated that, post King- 
III, there was evidence that the BIG4 audit firms were charging an audit fee premium 
in response to the recommendations of the code on IR, was accepted. 
The pooled regression displayed an adjusted R2 of 0.803, thus, confirming that the 
independent variables were responsible for 80.3% of the changes in audit fees.  All 
the coefficients on the BIG4 audit firms’ variables were positive, thus confirming that 
the BIG4 audit firms were all charging an audit fee premium as compared to the non-
BIG4 audit firms, although only the coefficients of auditor variables Firm 2 and Firm 3 
were significant at the 5% level of significance. The highest coefficient on variable 
Firm 2 confirmed that Firm 2 was charging the highest premium. Thus, the results 
appear to confirm the long-held view of the existence of a BIG Firm audit fee 
premium. This research finding also corroborates the findings of studies on the 
introduction of SOX in America (Griffin & Lont, 2007; Charles et al, 2010; Ebrahim, 
2010; Ciesielski & Weirich, 2006) which found the existence of a SOX-related 
premium. The coefficient of the King3 variable was also positive although not 
significant but was sufficient to prove that the introduction of King-III had been a 
positive factor in determining audit fees. 
In response to the second research question as to whether audit fees were related to 
non-audit service fees, the coefficient of the variable Ln (NASFEE) was positive and 
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significant at p<0.05, thus confirming that the two fees were correlated. This finding 
was further corroborated by high and significant Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 
all the years (See table 4.10). A further test in the form of factor analysis was also 
carried out to confirm this relationship. The results, displayed in table 4.9, especially 
as regards component 1, proved that both the audit fee and non-audit service fee 
variables were associated with measures of size. Thus, the relationship confirms that 
audit fees and non-audit fees are correlated and are, therefore, jointly determined  
(Hay et al, 2006). 
The research results appear to confirm that the improvement in the corporate 
governance framework, in response to global changes, has resulted in auditors in 
South Africa increasing the scope of their work. The provision of assurance services 
with regards to the forward-looking information as contained in the sustainability 
section of the IR, and the attendant processes thereof could bears testimony to this 
observation. In addition, the research study also confirmed the old-age perception 
that there is a relationship between audit fees and non-audit service fees which has 
been empirically proven to lead to an erosion of both auditor independence and audit 
quality. It may be that, as both the legal and corporate governance landscapes have 
continued to evolve, company boards and management have had to rely increasingly 
on the expert advice of consultants to ensure that their companies remain compliant 
with the JSE-listing rules, the law and best-in-class corporate governance practices 
and principles. In order to fully unpack the exact nature of the non-audit services that 
are being offered by auditors, further detailed research is required.  
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5.3 Areas for future research 
Desktop empirical results alone cannot suffice to provide all the answers into such a 
broad area of study. It would, thus, be more beneficial if the research could be 
extended to include non-listed companies so that a more generalisable view of the 
auditor market in South Africa could be obtained. Desktop results would also need to 
be complemented by surveys directed at senior management working in both the 
audit profession and private corporate organisations.  
Future areas of research could also attempt to quantify the percentage increase in 
the audit fee premium following the introduction of King-III. In order to build on the 
findings of this research study, more up-to-date data could be collected and 
analysed, using the same methodology as followed in this research study, so that the 
results can be comparable. In addition, since it has long been proven empirically that 
spill-over effects exist between audit and non-audit service fees, it is also 
recommended that future studies could consider combining audit fees and non-audit 
service fees and consider them as a composite fee. The cost of the internal audit 
department should also be considered in such research studies as a lot of valuable 
information seems to be lost if it is excluded as other companies, especially the big 
firms, “in-source” non-audit services and consultancy from their internal audit 
departments. A worthy triangulation of the research in this area would be to 
approach the subject by analysing the fees from the books of the audit firms, hoping 
that there is better allocation of costs in the books of the firms as they are the 
gatekeepers of global accounting standards. 
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In conclusion, it must be mentioned that, in view of the fact that King-III is still in its 
infancy in terms of being fully embraced and implemented by all companies in South 
Africa, and the fact that its application is on a voluntary basis, it is not possible to 
regard the results of this research study as conclusive at this stage. Nevertheless, 
the study does provide a very sound foundation and tone for future research in this 
interesting area.
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APPENDIX 2: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT
Original Columns Inserted Columns Type of data
1 Company Name
2 BVD ID Number Unique company ID on the database
3 Listed/Unlisted/Delisted Current status on the exchange
4 FT Industry Class Industry sector
5 Auditor Name
6 Currency of the Statement
7 Closing Date Year end date of the financials
8 Audit Fees (sub) th LCU
9 Auditors Consulting Fees (sub) the LCU Non-audit service fees
10 Total Assets th LCU
11 Stock the LCU The term Inventory was used in the research
12 Debtors the LCU The term Accounts Receivable was used in the research
13 No. of rec. subsidiaries Number of recorded subsidiaries
14 EBIT the LCU
15 Total Liabilities & Debt the LCU
16 Total Current Assets th LCU
17 Total Current Liabilities th LCU
18 BIG4
A dummy variable of 1 if auditor firm is one of the BIG4 
otherwise 0
19 Year The fiscal year in which the year end lies
 
 
 
 
 
 
